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RICO FORFEITURES, FORFEITABLE




The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)
includes sweeping provisionsfor inpersonamforfeiture. Federal prose-
cutors have begun to employ theseprovisions with increasingfrequency.
The authors maintain that RICO forfeitures must comply with the due
process requirements of the fifth amendment, but that current proce-
dures, based on congressionally-approved in rem practices, are constitu-
tionally inadequate. The Article focuses particularly on pretrial
restraining orders and post-verdict forfeiture procedures and examines
in depth the due process requirements at each of these stages. The au-
thors conclude that although Congress specj'ed tough fofeiture penal-
ties under RICO, the procedural means it provided for enforcing the
forfeiture provisions do not sufficiently protect the due process rights of
either defendants or third parties.
On February 22, 1982, Rex Cauble stood in a Texas federal court before a
jury of his peers.' The jury returned a verdict finding the 69 year-old Texas
oilman guilty of racketeering under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. section 19622 and entered a special verdict
for the criminal forfeiture of Cauble's interest in a Texas partnership. With a
stroke of the judge's pen, the United States became one-third owner of a vast
Texas business enterprise worth over 80,000,000 dollars. Included in the gov-
ernment's booty was a one-third interest in over 10,000 acres of Texas real
estate, substantial ownership of three Texas banks, majority ownership of sev-
eral Texas corporations, and over 450,000 shares of blue chip stock. Almost
overnight, Cauble's business associates and partners found themselves co-ven-
turers with Uncle Sam, not the Texas rancher who had spent all of his life
amassing a large fortune. If this were not strange enough, their new partner
t B.A. 1978, McGill; J.D. 1982, Georgetown. Member, District of Columbia Bar.
t B.A. 1979, Notre Dame; J.D. 1982, Georgetown. Member, New York Bar.
The authors wish to recognize and thank Professor Michael Tigar and Sam Buffone, Esq., for
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. See United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983). The Fifth Circuit affirmed
Cauble's conviction and hailed it as the "verdict of the country." Id at 1356. For a general
discussion of the Cauble case, see Lauter, U.S. Seizures ofAssets Accelerates, The Nat'l L.J., Sept.
6, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976) is part of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO). The substantive racketeering offenses are defined in § 1962, while the criminal pen-
alties for violating RICO are found at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976). For a discussion of the racke-
teering statute, see Project, White-Collar Crime: A SecondAnnual Survey of Law, 19 AM. CiuIm. L.
REv. 173, 351-70 (1981).
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had a statutory duty under RICO to liquidate its holdings.3 Stranger still,
neither the jury nor the judge in Cauble's case ever had the opportunity to
hear from these third parties. In fact, during the short two-week criminal trial,
the defendant also had no meaningful opportunity to address the trier-of-fact
concerning the extent of the forfeiture that would be entered. More impor-
tantly, while Cauble was stripped of his life's possessions on the basis of a
finding of criminal guilt, the persons associated with his sprawling business
ventures saw their property rights disappear without even the benefit of notice.
This Article addresses the diverse procedural problems presented by the
increasing use of the criminal forfeiture provisions of RICO.4 In particular,
the Article focuses on the application of these complex provisions5 to legiti-
mate business enterprises. 6 The Article first contends that the current proce-
dures for criminal forfeiture under RICO violate the fifth amendment because
the statute fails to provide procedural safeguards against erroneous property
deprivations to either the RICO defendant or third parties. The Article then
proposes minimal procedures both before and after the RICO trial that would
meet the demands of the fifth amendment.
The Article begins by depicting the statutory character of the in personam
forfeiture sanctions under RICO. Section I describes the historical and legal
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976) (government must "dispose" of all forfeited property "as
soon as commercially feasible").
4. See Lauter, supra note 1, at 8, col. 3 (Justice Department officials "have been pursuing
forfeiture with vigor"). The Cauble court emphatically noted that "[a]lthough it suffered initially
from limited use, RICO is now a frequently-employed arrow in the federal prosecutor's crime
fighting quiver." United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983). There are signs, how-
ever, that the rush to use RICO may be slowed by the constitutional concerns that this Article
addresses. Shortly after the Cauble judgment, a Justice Department official testified to a congres-
sional committee as follows:
It is now our position that. . . claimant[s]. . . asserting a legal interest in forfeited
property that cannot be co-extensive with the order of forfeiture, are entitled to a judicial
resolution of their claims, and that it is improper and arguably even unconstitutional for
a remission and mitigation process, which has traditionally been viewed as solely a mat-
ter of executive discretion, to be used as the forum for resolution of their asserted
interest.
The Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act of 1983: Hearing on H. 3299 Before the Subcomm on
Crime of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (1983) (statement of James
Knapp, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division).
5. Numerous commentators have addressed the substantive questions posed by the compli-
cated racketeering statute. See Atkinson, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18
U.S.C § 1961-68. .. Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CIUM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1
(1978); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)" Basic Con-
cepts-Criminal and Civil Penalities, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980); Bradley, Racketeers, Congress,
and the Courts: An Analysis ofRICO, 65 IowA L. REv. 837 (1980); McClellan, The Organized
Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens CivilLiberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55 (1970);
Tarlow, RCO: The New Darling ofthe Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165 (1980);
Note, Aiding andAbetting the Investment ofDirty Money: Mens Rea and the Non-Racketeer Under
RICO Section 1962(a), 82 COLUM. L. REV. 574 (1982); Note, Elliott v. United States: Conspiracy
Law and the Judicial Pursuit of Organized Crime Through RICO, 65 VA. L. REV. 109 (1979).
6. RICO can be used to forfeit the assets of both a legitimate and illegitimate "enterprise."
See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). When the prosecution attempts to forfeit the
assets of legitimate businesses, the valid proprietary rights of third parties and defendants are
significantly implicated. If the enterprise theory invoked by the prosecution involves an illegiti-
mate enterprise, the defendant and third parties have a considerably less colorable proprietary
claim to the alleged forfeitable interests.
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differences between forfeitures in personam and in rem and concludes that in
rem procedures may not be applied to in personam forfeitures. Section II dis-
cusses the in personam nature of a RICO forfeitures and introduces the central
issue: reconciling congressionally provided in rem procedures with the in per-
sonam nature of a RICO forfeiture. It identifies possible means of reconciling
this conflict and concludes that RICO forfeitures must be consistent with the
demand of both procedural due process and the in personam nature of the
racketeering statute.
Section III discusses the general requirements of procedural due process:
notice and the opportunity to be heard. Section IV applies these broad man-
dates in the specific context of a pretrial restraining oider provided under
RICO to prevent transfer of assets prior to trial on the merits. Section V con-
siders procedural due process requirements at the post-verdict stage, at which
a finding of forfeitability is entered. Each section presents the substantive
questions raised at these proceedings and then discusses the various proce-
dural trappings particularly required by the due process clause. The issues
addressed include the timing of the hearing, notice, neutrality of the factfinder
and the formality of the proceedings. The Article concludes that notwith-
standing the significant goals that Congress sought to further by providing for-
feiture penalties under RICO, the means it provided are constitutionally
inadequate. Federal courts must realize these procedural due process deficien-
cies and begin to apply the due process requirements of the Constitution to
RICO forfeitures.
I. FORFEITURE IN GENERAL
A. A Preliminary Framework
In order to evaluate the adequacy of the procedures currently employed
to effectuate a RICO forfeiture, it is necessary before examining the racketeer-
ing statute itself to understand something about forfeitures. Not all forfeitures
are alike.7 As a criminal penalty, forfeiture operates in personam, or against
the person. At early common law, in personam forfeitures wrested from the
defendant the entirety of his property rights upon conviction.8 Imposed to
punish, in personam forfeiture before RICO was virtually unknown to federal
criminal law.9 Civil forfeiture, on the other hand, is in rem, a penalty against
7. See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1 (1827); Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties
and Forfeitures.: A Frameworkfor ConstitutionalAnalysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 476 (1976); Note,
Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 800 (1977).
8. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974); United States
v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980). See also 3 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 68-71 (5th ed. 1942); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 351 (2d ed. 1899).
9. See United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 959 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. granted
sub nom. Ruselo v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Rubi!, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th
Cir. 1977), vacated, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), ad in part, rev'd in part, 59F F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 861 (1979); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 140 (N.D. Ga. 1979);
United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 682 (D. Md. 1976).
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a specific res that has been used for an unlawful purpose regardless of the
owner's culpability.10 "Long before adoption of the constitution," the com-
mon law courts "were exercising jurisdiction in rem in the enforcement of for-
feiture statutes."" Contemporary in rem statutes forfeit property employed in
numerous types of wrongful conduct.' 2 In contrast to the clear punitive pur-
pose of in personam forfeiture, forfeiture in rem draws legal justification from
diverse archaic rationales long rehearsed in constitutional litigation.
13
A RICO forfeiture requires a finding of personal guilt in a criminal prose-
cution; it is in personam and is imposed as punishment.' 4 Unlike in personam
forfeiture at common law, however, RICO does not forfeit a defendant's entire
estate, but instead a specific property interest in a criminal enterprise.' 5 Some-
times in scope, but never in theory, RICO resembles in rem forfeitures.
Nevertheless, the only laws even arguably applicable to determining what
procedures to apply to a RICO forfeiture are those applied to in rem proceed-
ings. Moreover, courts have tended to apply in rem case law in construing
RICO's substantive forfeiture provisions.16 Whether forfeiture in rem analo-
gies may successfully carry over to an in personam forfeiture such as RICO is
a question properly resolved by closely looking at the legal and historical dif-
ferences between in rem and in personam forfeiture. To place the specific
provisions of a RICO forfeiture in perspective, the Article begins by setting
forth this framework.
B. In Personam Forfeiture
In personam forfeiture follows an adjudication of guilt. At common law,
conviction of felony automatically forfeited a defendant's personalty to the
Crown and escheated all realty to his lord; a convicted traitor forfeited both to
the Crown.' 7 In medieval England the Crown ultimately held all land and
property as part of the bond of allegiance between the King, as feudal lord,
10. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974); Gold-
smith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1920); Vance v. United States, 676 F.2d 183,
186 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 456 (7th Cir.
1980). See also Clark, supra note 7, at 476.
11. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943).
12. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3617 (1976) (liquor violations); 18 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976) (illegal
bribes); 18 U.S.C. § 1082 (1976) (gambling); 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1976) (narcotics violations); 19
U.S.C. § 1594, 1595(a) (1976) (customs-revenue laws); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7301-7303 (1976) (internal
revenue laws).
13. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974);
United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-21 (1971); Goldsmith-Grant
Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-13 (1921); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15
(1827); Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 291, 312-20 (1818).
14. See infra notes 96-116 and accompanying text (discussing theory of RICO forfeiture).
15. United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1982) (Politz, J., dissenting), cert.
granted sub nom. Russello v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d
975, 991 n.15 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 140 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
16. See infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
17. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 68-7 1; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 8,
at 351 (2d ed. 1899).
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and society.18 Breach of the law offended the King's peace; 19 the worst trans-
gressions, deemed felonies, gave rise to the most severe sanctions. Indeed,
early English law defined felony as any offense occasioning forfeiture of either
lands or goods or both.20 In addition to forfeiture, conviction of felony "cor-
rupted" the defendant's blood, preventing property from passing by inheri-
tance through him, and thereby depriving persons "kindred to felons" of their
normal property rights.2 1 "He who has thus violated the fundamental princi-
ples of government, and broken his part of the original contract between King
and people ... has no longer any right to. . .social advantages. . . Trans-
ferring or transmitting property to others is one of the chief."
22
The American colonies did not welcome forfeiture of estate for conviction
of a felony.23 The severe consequences for innocent descendants 24 and the
failure of colonial governments to benefit from goods escheated to the crown 25
eventually led to virtually wholesale prohibition of the practice. In 1787, the
framers of the Constitution, with little debate,26 banned imposition of forfei-
ture of estate and corruption of blood for the offense of treason;27 three years
later the first Congress abolished forfeiture of estate for all convictions and
judgments.28 Since then,29 and until RICO, in personam forfeiture has not
resurfaced in American jurisprudence.
18. See United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919
(1980); 2 L. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrTION OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 1299-
1300 at 178-80 (3d ed. 1858).
19. See Taylor, Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963-JCO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 379, 381-82 (1980).
20. 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 583-84 (8th ed. Boston 1892) (listed
Boston 1856).
21. See 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 20, at 584; 2 J. STORY, supra note 18, § 1300, at 179-80; 2 J.
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 385-87 (5th ed. 1844).
22. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *382. "Such forfeitures, moreover, whereby his pos-
terity must suffer as well as himself, will help to restrain a man, not only by the sense of his duty
and dread of personal punishment, but also by his passions and natural affections." Id
23. Forfeiture practices varied from colony to colony, but were never as harsh as in England.
See Note, supra note 7, at 776-77; see generally, 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 20, at 585-86.
24. 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 20, at 584; J. KENT, supra note 21, at 385; Note, supra note 7, at
779.
25. See F. DOYLE, CRIMINAL FORFErruRE 11 (Library of Congress Congressional Research
Service (1971).
26. .d at 14 n.52.
27. "The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder
of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. For judicial recognition of this legal history, see Wal-
lach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 208-11 (1875).
28. "Provided always, and be it enacted, that no conviction or judgment for any of the of-
fences aforesaid, shall work corruption of blood, or any forfeiture of estate." Act of Apr. 30, 1790,
§ 24, 1 Stat. 117. England abolished most forfeitures of estate for convictions of felony or treason
in 1870. See The Forfeiture Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 23. See also 1 J. BisHoP, supra note 20,
at 585; 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 63.
29. The ban on forfeiture of estate has remained intact in American jurisprudence. See 18
U.S.C. § 3563 (1976) (based upon 18 U.S.C. § 544 (1940)). Both statutory and constitutional
prohibitions envision complete forfeiture--"total disinheritance of one's heirs or those who would
be one's heirs and forfeiture of all of one's property and estate." United States v. Grande, 620
F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980). The only other federal criminal stat-
ute providing for in personam forfeiture is 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976), the "kingpin" narcotics statute.
Enacted on the heels of RICO, the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statute has also been
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
C. In Rem Foifeiture
A suit in rem civilly determines rights to property against all the world.
30
Forfeiture in rem establishes the government's superior right to the res upon
proof of the property's "guilt" in violating customs, revenue or narcotics laws,
regardless of the owner's culpability.3 1 Thus, a vehicle used to transport a
passenger carrying one-thirtieth of an ounce of marijuana had "guilt in the
wrong" and was forfeit, despite lack of knowledge on the part of the driver, or
of the owner (his mother).32 Numerous similar examples abound.33 The gov-
ernment's right to the property vests at the moment of illegal use. 34 Hence, in
rem forfeitures effectively extinguish rights of unwitting secured parties35 and
subsequent purchasers of the guilty res. 36 In these civil proceedings the claim-
ant has the burden of proof to show lack of probable cause for the seizure.
37
The property owner's innocence is irrelevant. 38 Only in later administrative
proceedings as provided by the customs laws39 may the property owner appeal
to government discretion, largely unreviewable,40 to remit or mitigate forfeit-
the subject of recent judicial inquiry in the procedural due process area. This Article cites to
pertinent CCE precedent when based upon the in personam nature of that statute.
30. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 136 (1943).
31. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827) contains the classical statement explain-
ing the difference between in rem and in personam forfeiture:
It is well known, that at the common law, in many cases of felonies, the party forfeited
his goods and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture did not, strictly speaking, attach in
rem; but it was a part, or at least a consequence, of the judgment of conviction....
The crown's right to the goods and chattels attached only by the conviction of the of-
fender. . . . But this doctrine never was applied to seizures and forfeitures, created by
the statute, in rem, cognizable on the revenue side of the Exchequer. The thing is here
primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the
thing; and this, whether the offence be malum prohibium, or malum in se. . . . The
practice has been, and so this Court understand [sic] the law to be, that the proceeding in
rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in
personam.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
32. United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile Auto, 256 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1958).
33. See J.W. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1920) (forfeiture of auto-
mobile used to transport tax-unpaid distilled spirits over objection of secured party); United States
v. Edwards, 368 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1966) (forfeiture of coin-operated gaming devices when tax-
payer merely misinterpreted the appropriate tax form). See generally Finkelstein, The Goring Ox:
Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of
Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 213-22 (1973).
34. Florida Dealers & Growers Bank v. United States, 279 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1960).
35. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
36. See Note, supra note 7, at 773 n.37; see generally United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 416 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1976). This rule has been the law since the Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat.
29, 43-44. See United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 456 (1980).
38. See United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 238 (1844) (forfeiture
upheld despite "fully established" innocence of shipowner). Indeed, the in rem forfeiture pro-
ceedings had no concern for the criminal culpability of the property owner. Instead, "there must
be proof that the thing proceeded against was subjected to some unlawful use, or was found in
some unlawful condition." Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 321-22 (1870) (Field,
J., dissenting).
39. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1613, 1618 (1976).
40. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980);
United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980
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ures for lack of culpability. 41
"Ancient rules maintain themselves," said Holmes, when "new reasons
more fitted to the time have been found for them."'42 Ascribing to property a
"certain personality" and finding that it has "guilt in the wrong" 43 is a curious
fiction.44 Furthermore, dispensing with the property owner's innocence yet
putting the claimant to his proof-and narrowly restricting judicial review-is
a procedural anomaly, recalling "old, forgotten, far-off things and battles long
ago."'45 How and why forfeiture in rem became "firmly fixed" 46 in American
jurisprudence is an inquiry that begins with the Bible, advances to eighteenth
century admiralty and ends with Supreme Court precedent.
(1) Deodand
Common law forfeited to the Crown as a deodand47 the value of an ob-
ject causing tortious death of a King's subject.4 8 The tree from which a person
fell, the well in which he drowned, the sword that "killeth" him and the horse
or steam engine that struck him49 -all were subject to forfeiture and sale, with
proceeds due the Crown. Biblical and pre-Christian traditions describe the
doctrine's origin; medieval and modem England explain its growth.
The Biblical beginning is Exodus 2:28: "If an ox gore a man or woman,
and they die, he shall be stoned; and his flesh shall not be eaten." According
to early Judeo-Christian belief, an ordained hierarchy of creation established
the human race as lord of life; an ox that gores a person to death offends the
terrestial order and commits "high treason" against God.50 Appeasement of
the sovereign required a communal remedy of expiation attained by stoning
the ox, analogically a limited form of forfeiture.5' Similarly, a pre-Christian,
(1972); United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 732 (6th Cir. 1964); Jary Leasing Corp.
v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
41. 19 U.S.C. § 1613 (1976) provides for mitigation or remission of forfeiture for violations
incurred "without any willful negligence or intention to defraud." Regulations implementing the
customs laws procedures explain that mitigation or remission of forfeiture applies if the property
owner did not know or have reason to know that his property would be used by another to violate
the law. 19 C.F.R. § 171.13(a) (1982). See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663, 689 n.27 (1974); Smith, Modern Forfeiture Law and Policy." A Proposalfor Reform, 19 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 661, 671 (1978).
42. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881).
43. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921).
44. Indeed, the Supreme Court has itself recognized the illogic of in rem forfeiture despite
consistently upholding its use. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 637 (1886) ("In the words
of a great judge, Goods, cannot offend, forfeit, unlade, pay duties, or the like, but men whose
goods they are' ").
45. United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 461 (1980).
46. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921).
47. The term comes from the latin Deo dandum, "a thing to be given to God." Black's Law
Dictionary 523 (4th ed. 1968).
48. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974).
49. See 0. HOLMES, supra note 42, at 24-25.
50. Finkelstein, supra note 33, at 180-81.
51. Id Professor Finkelstein points out that stoning the ox was not precisely a forfeiture
because the ox was not "given to God" or returned to society, but rather put to death. Nonethe-
less, commentators uniformly traced the origin of the deodand doctrine back to the Biblical exam-
ple. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 85 (7th ed. 1956); 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
1983]
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secular practice in Europe, Rome, and Africa known as "noxal surrender"
required surrender to the victim or to his kin the instrument causing accidental
damage or death.5 2 Noxal surrender was intended to provide a type of ransom
to forestall an injured party's resort to civil action.
5 3
Religious expiation and noxal surrender merged in medieval England, in
the personage of the King. The religious climate and papal-state confficts of
the thirteenth century encouraged the Crown to assume the role of the tran-
scendent power to whom expiation was dueP 4 Ostensibly, the Crown sought
the deodand to redress loss of human life by procuring Masses for the soul of
the deceased;55 not surprisingly, forfeiture also provided a steady source of
Crown revenue.
5 6
Nineteenth-century, post-Enlightenment England eschewed the law of
deodand as "extremely absurd and inconvenient. '57 The institution, however,
survived, as new content sustained the old form: 5 8 forfeiture came to be
viewed as a deterrent to negligence. Because a remedy for wrongful death
never existed at common law,59 the threat of forfeiture may have established a
higher degree of care by exacting a penalty for carelessness. 60 Punishment of
MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 472-74 (2d ed. 1899); 0. HOLMES, supra note 42, at 23.
One reason the example of the ox may be appropriate is the depiction of vengence it embodies,
commonly felt, for example, in the desire to strike at an object that accidentally causes one harm.
See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra at 274 (concept of deodand not different from the
instinct to curse the chair over which one stumbles); 0. HOLMES, supra note 42, at I I (forfeiture of
inanimate objects results from the "hatred for anything giving us pain, which wreaks itself on the
manifest cause, and which leads even civilized man to kick a door when it pinches his finger").
52. Finkelstein, supra note 33, at 181.
53. Id
54. Id at 181-83.
55. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 51,
at 474.
56. See LAW OF DEODANDS, 34 Law Mag. 188, 198 (1845). Cf. 77 J. HANSARD, PARLIAMEN-
TARY DEBATES 1027 (1845) (Lord Campbell) ("the law of deodands was called into action almost
weekly").
57. 77 J. HANSARD, supra note 56, at 1027.
58. 0. HOLMES, supra note 42, at 5 ("the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have
been found for it .... The old form receives a new content").
59. Baker v. Bolston, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius 1808) ("In a civil court, the death of a
human being cannot be complained of as an injury .. "). Explanation of the rule reflects the
religious tenor of a time that witnesses the growth of the deodand doctrine. "To the cultivated
and enlightened mind, looking at human life in the light of the Christian religion as sacred, the
idea of compensating its loss in money is revolting ... " Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 192
(1867).
60. M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 424 (Ist Am. ed. 1847). Although common law forfei-
ture was applied to various types of tortuous death or injury, see Finkelstein, supra note 33, at
183-90, Hale argues that deodands were properly applied only when death resulted from negli-
gence. History lends support to this view. Abolition of deodands occurred at the same time as
passage of the first wrongful death statute. The bill that eventually became the Act for Compen-
sating Families of Persons Killed by Accidents, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 93, was initially introduced
with the proposal to abolish deodands. The tort bills were brought together because "objectiona-
ble as the system of deodands was. . . [Lord Campbell] would not abolish it, having regard to
public safety, unless the right action was given, in order to make railroad directors and stage coach
proprietors cautious of the lives and limbs of her Majesty's subjects." 77 J. HANSARD, supra note
56, at 1031. See generally Finkelstein, supra note 33, at 170-74; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.19 (1974).
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the property owner whose negligence had caused "death by misadventure" 6 1
triggered forfeiture of the offending res. Nonetheless, even after the abolition
of deodands in 184662 and simultaneous passage of the Act for Compensating
Families of Persons Killed by Accidents, 63 the Crown continued to confiscate
guilty property solely as a source of Crown revenue.
64
Deodands did not become part of the American common law tradition.65
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has referred to them as one of the forebears
of federal forfeiture laws.
66
(2) Admiralty
Violation of seventeenth century Navigation Acts6 7 that required ship-
ping of commodities in English built, owned, and manned vessels caused for-
feiture of not only illegally transported goods, but also the ship that carried
them.68 Vicarious liability also attached: a sailor's single act could forfeit an
entire ship even if committed contrary to the express wishes of master or own-
er.69 The claimant bore the burden of proving statutory compliance.70 In the
American colonies, moreover, the shipowner proceeded before newly estab-
lished vice-admiralty courts, not a jury.
71
Severe in effect, in rem forfeiture under the Navigation Acts embodied a
unique principle, unrelated to deodand or noxal surrender.72 With no sover-
eign on the high seas to enforce laws of admiralty against foreign sailors, for-
feiture provided a means, and probably the only means, of exacting statutory
61. Finkelstein, supra note 33, at 229 n.194. In cases of intentional homicide, the provisions
of in personam, criminal forfeiture applied, not deodands. See 15 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 164 (1965).
62. An Act to Abolish Deodands, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 62.
63. An Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents, 1846, 9 & 10 V.
ch. 93.
64. See Regina v. Woodrow, 15 M. & W. 404, 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (Ex. 1846).
65. See, e.g., Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 188 S.W. 54 (1916).
66. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921); see generaly Finkel-
stein, supra note 33, at 215 (current Supreme Court in rem interpretation is "hardly more than an
attempt to put an ostensibly respectable disguise on an action which is at bottom nothing else than
the deodand 'updated' ").
67. See L. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS: A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EXPERI-
MENT IN SOCIAL ENGINEERING 387-414 (1964) (digest of Acts).
68. Id at 109-11. See generally Note, supra note 7, at 774 ("[t]he Navigation Acts were the
major component of English policy to promote national seapower").
69. Mitchell qui tam v. Torup, 145 Eng. Rep. 764 (Ex 1766).
70. 12 Geo. 1, ch. 28, § 8 (1725).
71. The Crown established these new courts to ensure preservation of its Navigation Acts
revenue from the "obstinate resistance of American juries." C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S.
133, 141 (1943); see generally Worth, The Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court and the Federal
Admiralty Jurisdiction, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 250 (1962); Warren, New Light on the History ofthe
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923). In a recent thoughtful opinion, the
Seventh Circuit analyzed English and American history and concluded that because in rem forfei-
ture cases were triable to a jury in common law English courts, the seventh amendment right to a
jury trial for in rem forfeitures has been preserved. United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz
280S, 618 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1980).
72. Finkelstein, supra note 33, at 231. But see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974).
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compliance. "[T]he ship was not only the source, but the limit, of liability. '73
The strength of this rationale insured its survival. In contrast to statutory abo-
lition of criminal in personam forfeiture,74 the first Congress statutorily sub-
jected to in rem forfeiture vessels and cargoes violating customs laws. 75 Early
in the nineteenth century the Supreme Court upheld these procedures,
modeled after the Navigation Acts, 76 in deciding that a conviction of piracy
was not essential to the forfeiture of a ship.77 The Court distinguished in per-
sonam forfeiture imposed as a consequence of conviction from forfeiture in
rem, where "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender. 78 In a
later decision the Court sustained forfeiture despite the shipowner's "fully es-
tablished" innocence,79 approving this remedy as "the only adequate means of
suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured
party."80 The unspoken but underlying rationale of both opinions, however,
may well have been a strong desire to preserve customs revenues81
(3) Modem Rationales
No one explanation sustains the continuing validity of forfeiture in rem
except, perhaps, the passage of time. In Gold-smith-Grand Co. v. United
States82 a car dealer sold an automobile but retained title as security for the
unpaid purchase price. The purchaser transported distilled spirits in violation
of revenue laws and the government sought forfeiture of the car. Rejecting the
vendor's fifth amendment objections, the Court first underscored the impor-
tance of revenue enforcement. It then proceeded to adopt the offending res
fiction, draw analogies to religious purposes of deodand, acknowledge applica-
tion of forfeiture as a punishment for a property owner's negligence, and cite
the Bible.83 Without further discussion or analysis, the Court concluded,
73. 0. HOLMES, supra note 42, at 27.
74. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
75. Act of July 31, 1789, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 39, 47.
76. See generally Note, supra note 7, at 780.
77. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
78. Id at 14.
79. United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
80. Id at 233.
81. Justice Story authored both of these opinions. During his lifetime, customs duties pro-
vided no less than 70% to 80% of federal revenues. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T. OF COM-
MERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 33, 86TH CONO., IST
SEs. 712 (1960).
82. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
83. The Court stated:
Congress must have taken into account the necessities of the Government, its reve-
nues and policies, and was faced with the necessity of making provision against their
violation or evasion. In breaches of revenue provisions, some forms of property are fa-
cilities, and therefore it may be said, that Congress interposes the care and responsibility
of their owners in aid of the prohibitions of the law and its punitive provisions, by ascrib-
ing to the property a certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in wrong. In
such case there is some analogy to the law of deodand by which a personal chattel that
was the immediate cause of the death of any reasonable creature was forfeited. To the
superstitious reason to which the rule was ascribed, Blackstone adds "that such misfor-
tunes are in part owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly
punished by such forfeiture." And he observed, "A like punishment is in like cases in-
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"whether the reason for the [forfeiture] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed
in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced."
'84
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed each of the historical rationales of
in rem forfeiture.8 5 Yet the Court also expressed willingness to curtail applica-
tion of the harsh effects of forfeiture in rem to innocent third parties.86 The
federal courts in similar fashion have begun to recognize significant proce-
dural rights in the in rem setting.87 Although embedded in over a century and
a half of American jurisprudence, the "fictive rule" 88 that in rem forfeitures
are not subject to constitutional protections in the criminal field is perhaps
beginning to weaken.
D. Judicial Comparison
Comparison of in rem and in personam forfeiture procedures occurred in
a short but important series of late nineteenth century Supreme Court deci-
sions. In Boyd v. United States89 the Court held that a property owner could
claim the privilege against self-incrimination in an in rem proceeding when
the pertinent statute required a showing of criminal culpability prior to forfei-
ture. The procedure, regardless of name, was one in personam: "Proceedings
instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by
reasons of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in
their nature criminal." 90 Similarly, when a statute imposed forfeiture "as a
consequence of guilt and as a punishment therefor," the Court held that ac-
flicted by the Mosaical law: If an ox gore a man that he die, the ox shall be stoned, and
his flesh shall not be eaten."
Id at 510-11.
84. Id at 511.
85. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-86 (1974).
86. Id at 689-90 ("It would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner...
who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that
he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property;
for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate pur-
poses and was not unduly oppressive."). See United States v. One Tintoretto Painting, 691 F.2d
603, 607 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing and applying Calero-Toledo forfeiture exception).
87. Vance v. United States, 676 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1982) (The "civil nature of forfeiture
proceedings will not be permitted to provide an avenue through which the fundamental rights of
F rotection against unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination can be frustrated.")
quoting Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 973 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974));
United States v. One Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1980) (seventh amendment jury
trial right applies to in rem forfeiture proceedings); Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757, 762 (9th Cir.
1979) (due process right to notice); United States v. Spetz, 705 F.2d 1155, 1166 (9th Cir. 1983) (no
"forfeiture" exception to fourth amendment). See generally Kandaras, Due Process and Federal
Property Forfeiture Statutes,- The Needfor Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 Sw. L.J. 925 (1980),
[hereinafter cited as Kandaras]; Smith, supra note 41, at 691.
88. Vance v. United States, 676 F.2d 183, at 186 (5th Cir. 1982).
89. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
90. Id at 634. Although Boyd arguably has been overruled today for its interpretation of the
self-incrimination privilege, see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 405-08 (1976); Note, he
Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United
States, 95 HARV. L. REv. 683 (1982), it is still good forfeiture law. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965).
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quittal in the criminal prosecution barred a subsequent in rem suit.91 A later
decision held that a pardon remits any forfeiture incurred.92 At the turn of the
century the Court again indicated that when forfeiture necessitates a showing
of "criminal intent" and commission of "prohibited acts" (as opposed to proof
of "guilty property"), the full panoply of procedural rights afforded criminal
defendants must come into play. 93 These cases, in short, hold that if forfeiture
requires a showing of personal guilt, and is thus in personam, then in rem
procedural rules may not constitutionally suffice. Rather, the property owner
must be afforded rights historically provided to criminal defendants, in per-
sonam. The Court recently reiterated this principle in United States v. United
States Coin and Currency,94 an in rem proceeding to forfeit money used in an
illegal bookmaking operation. The government argued, over the property
owner's objections, that the privilege against self-incrimination should not be
available. The Court disagreed, reading the statute as manifesting an intent
"to impose a penalty only upon those who were significantly involved in a
criminal enterprise." 95 Thus, the Court found that in personam procedures,
which provide greater due process protections than in rem procedures, should
apply.
E. Retrospect
A number of observations may be gleaned from this short historical and
legal sketch. Foremost is the different rationales distinguishing in personam
from in rem forfeiture. The sole purpose of in personam forfeiture is, and
always has been, punishment. Forfeiture in rem, however, is neither singular
in purpose nor consistent of theory. Arising out of pre-Christian traditions,
the institution of deodands provided expiation to the sovereign and reparation
to the victim; from medieval England forfeiture arose as punishment for care-
lessness and a source of revenue for the Crown; admiralty law, out of neces-
sity, viewed the ship as the only source of liability in attempting to ensure
collection of revenue and indemnify the government for enforcement costs.
The Supreme Court recognized but did not actually adopt any of these theo-
ries, preferring instead to uphold the in rem procedure only because "firmly
fixed."
91. Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 443 (1886).
92. Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474, 477 (1875).
93. See Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 188 (1897). This line of Supreme Court deci-
sions is aptly discussed in Note, supra note 7, at 788 n.114. The statutes upon which the cases were
based were passed subsequent to the Civil War Confiscation Acts. See Act of July 17, 1862, 12
Stat. 589 (cited in Note, supra note 7, at 788 n.144). The Confiscation Acts employed in rem
proceedings to impose forfeiture as punishment. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Confiscation Acts as an exercise of the war power in obtaining enemy property. Tyler v.
Defees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 331 (1870). As a result, after the Civil War Congress began to provide
in rem proceedings to effectuate forfeiture, regardless of whether the underlying theory was in
personam (based upon a finding of personal guilt) or in rem (based upon a finding of guilty
property). See Note, supra note 7, at 785-88. The aforementioned Supreme Court decisions
served to draw a theoretical boundary between in rem and in personam forfeiture that has re-
mained to this day.
94. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
95. Id at 721-22.
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A second observation is the distinct legal theories supporting in rem and
in personam forfeitures. A proceeding in which the claimant must prove his
property "not guilty," and in which innocence is not a defense even to third
parties, and in which judicial review is narrowly circumscribed is constitution-
ally sufficient only if the action is in fact against property. If forfeiture de-
pends upon a showing of the property owner's criminal intent, familiar
principles of criminal procedure apply. The government assuredly bears the
burden of proof, a defendant's innocence is critical, third party rights are not
before the court, and constitutional procedures must apply. We conclude from
these observations that the historical and legal differences between in rem and
in personam forfeiture make inapplicable the body of in rem forfeiture case
law to an in personam setting, such as RICO.
II. RICO
.4. Nature and Purpose of Fofeiture
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act imposes strin-
gent criminal sanctions on persons who, through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity, acquire an interest in or conduct the affairs of an "enterprise.
96
"Racketeering activity" is involvement in two or more acts proscribed by
twenty-four existing federal statutes97 and eight generic state offenses; the term
"enterprise" is defined to include partnerships, corporations, and other legal
entities. 98 The penalties for RICO violations are severe,99 including twenty-
five thousand dollar fines, twenty year imprisonments, and forfeitures.1° °
A RICO forfeiture requires an adjudication of guilt for the government to
obtain superior rights to the defendant's property.' 0 ' This in personam forfei-
ture is a powerful, innovative measure' 0 2 that furthers two purposes.' 0 3 As a
prophylactic, forfeiture acts to purge organized crime from the affairs of legiti-
mate businesses and labor organizations through separation of the racketeer
from the enterprise. 1 4 Primarily, however, a RICO forfeiture punishes.10 5 Its
application thus recalls the doctrine of forfeiture of estate, abolished constitu-
tionally for the offense of treason in 1787 and statutorily for all other judg-
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976); see United States v. Bagaric, 707 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
99. See Project, White-Collar Crime: SecondAnnual Survey of Law, 19 AM. CSuM. L. REv.
173, 357 n.1446 (1981).
100. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976).
102. Taylor, supra note 19, at 379.
103. See United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 992 (5th Cir. 1977); vacated and remanded, 439
U.S. 810 (1978), reinstated in relevant part, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864
(1979); Organized Crime Control- Hearings on S. 30 andRelatedProposals Before Subcomm. No. 5
of the House Judiciary Comm, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
104. United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 957 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. granted sub
nom. Russello v. United States, 457 U.S. 1108 (1983).
105. See House Hearings, supra note 103, at 107.
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ments in 1790.1 6 Courts have disagreed whether RICO in fact imposes
"forfeiture of estate" as a matter of constitutional or statutory interpreta-
tion.107 Undisputed, however, is the nature of a RICO forfeiture. As the Jus-
tice Department explained in testimony supporting the 1970 enactment of
RICO:
The concept of forfeiture as a criminal penalty which is embodied in
this provision differs from other presently existing forfeiture provi-
sions under Federal statutes where the proceeding is in rem against
the property and the thing which is declared unlawful under the stat-
ute, or which is used for an unlawful purpose, or in connection with
the prohibited property or transaction, is considered the offender,
and the forfeiture is not part of the punishment for the criminal
offense....
Under the criminal forfeiture provision of [RICO], the proceed-
ing is in personam against the defendant who is the party to be pun-
ished upon conviction of violation of any provision of the section,
not only by fine and/or imprisonment, but also by forfeiture .... 108
Notwithstanding legislative recognition of a RICO forfeiture as in per-
sonam in character and contrary to the historical distinction between in per-
sonam and in rem forfeiture, a number of courts have failed to differentiate
between the two types of proceedings in reviewing RICO's forfeiture provi-
sions.' °9 The Fourth Circuit recently stated that because in rem proceedings
also impose penalties upon persons, "the fact that the proceeding is in per-
sonam rather than in rem seems of little significance."1 0 The court, however,
erroneously relied upon United States v. United States Coin and Currency,"'I
which, as noted earlier," 2 involved an ostensibly in rem statute with a plainly
in personam effect. Moreover, the so-called "punitive" aspect of in rem forfei-
ture, to the extent it has survived historically, derives not from a finding of
personal guilt but from deodand, an institution traditionally thought to deter
carelessness through punishment of negligent property owners rather than
felons." 3 Hence, the Second Circuit was incorrect when it stated that for pe-
nal purposes, "there is no substantial difference between an in rem proceeding
106. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
107. Compare United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 n.15 (5th Cir. 1977) (use of § 1963 is
based on statutory interpretation but requires "interpretive caution"), vacated and remanded, 439
U.S. 810 (1978), reinstatedin relevantpart, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979)
with United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir. 1980) (§ 1963 is not invalid based on
constitutional interpretation), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980).
108. S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1969); see United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp.
274, 280 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon II); H.R. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CoNo. REC. 35, 193
(1970) (remarks ofRep. Poff); S. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG,. REc. 18, 929 (1970) (remarks
of Sen. McClellan).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 242 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon II).
110. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir. 1980).
111. 401 U.S. 715 (1970).
112. See supra text accompanying note 94.
113. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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and a forfeiture proceeding brought directly against the owner."' 1 4 Finally,
one district court inaccurately intertwined the different underlying theories of
in rem and in personam forfeiture in finding, without further analysis, "neither
a constitutional nor a statutory barrier to the limited forfeiture of property
used to violate the criminal law.' 15
The results of these decisions are less important than their reasoning. Le-
gal history and theory dictate that courts should take heed of the qualitative
differences between in rem and in personam forfeiture in deciding what proce-
dures a RICO forfeiture requires. As one district court remarked in reflecting
upon the history of forfeiture: "These distinctions between proceedings in rem
and in personam make resort to civil forfeiture cases as guidance in criminal
forfeiture cases, highly dubious."
' 16
B. Effect of Forfeiture
According to some courts, a RICO forfeiture is not that severe, for it is
"limited" to the defendant's interest in the enterprise and takes effect only
after criminal conviction. 17 To the contrary, a RICO forfeiture may: (1) dis-
solve a defendant's entire business and thereby destroy "a substantial portion
of his livelihood;"' "18 (2) extinguish or severely impair third party interest in
the same property; 19 and (3) cut short alienability and enjoyment of all poten-
tially forfeitable property before trial to the economic detriment of both de-
fendant and third party.
120
A convicted racketeer forfeits any "interest" in an enterprise acquired or
maintained in violation of RICO.12 1 Forfeitable interests undoubtably encom-
pass all types of proprietary rights, 122 including business, 123 partnership or
stock ownership, 124 and any elected offices affording influence over the enter-
114. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980).
115. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 140 (N.D. Ga. 1979), a}7'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2300 (1982).
116. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 242 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
117. See United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1029 (4th Cir.) ("effect of a forfeiture under
§ 1963 is the functional equivalent of a forfeiture in rem"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980);
United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 134, 141 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (RICO involves "limited forfei-
ture of property utilized to violate the criminal law"), aj'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cer. denied,
102 S. Ct. 2300 (1982); see also United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d at 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
banc) (Politz, J., dissenting) (Congress has frequently used the onus of specific forfeitures in com-
batting legal activities; RICO is so restricted), cert. grantedsub nom Rusello v. United States, 103
S. Ct. 721 (1983).
118. United States v. L'Hoste, 615 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir.) (rate, J., dissenting) (RICO may
forfeit "a lifetime's legitimate earnings"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
119. See United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 280-81 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon II).
120. Id at 281-82; see infra note 179 and accompanying text.
121. See United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 975, 990-92 (5th Cir. 1977); 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
122. United States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
123. United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84, 86-88 (9th Cir. 1982) (market/pharmacy and night-
club forfeit); United States v. Smaldone, 583 F.2d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 1978) (restaurant forfeit),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
124. United States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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prise, such as union executive positions. 125 Virtually any of the various com-
mon-law and state-created forms of property may be forfeited, including joint
tenancies and community property. 126 The Ninth Circuit aptly described the
potentially draconian dimensions of a RICO forfeiture: "A shopkeeper who
over many years and with much honest labor establishes a valuable business
could forfeit it all if, in the course of his business, he is mixed up in a single
fraudulent scheme."127 In no sense is this forfeiture "limited."
The severity of the forfeiture sanction affects not only defendants but es-
pecially third parties who have interests in the forfeited property. Partners
may not welcome the United States as a new partner; secured parties will not
particularly appreciate forfeiture of their secured interests; and shareholders
cannot be said to happily suffer economic loss when a substantial part or all of
their corporation is forfeited upon a defendant/co-owner's conviction. Under
RICO, a convicted racketeer forfeits directly, but a third party, whose interest
is never before the court, forfeits inadvertently.
Finally, long before conviction both defendant and third party property
interests may sustain significant loss. To prevent post-indictment pre-convic-
tion transfers of potentially forfeitable property, Congress authorized district
courts to enter pretrial restraining orders. 128 From the time of the order, and
arguably from return of the indictment, 129 until conviction, substantial eco-
nomic consequences result simply from inability to use property. 130 Restraints
on sale or transfer of stock shares or partnership interests, depreciating asset
value and lost market opportunities are readily cognizable financial losses; no
less detrimental is impairment of credit rating, goodwill or market position
merely because of the pendency of racketeering proceedings. Moreover, in a
complex RICO prosecution the period between indictment and conviction
may well exceed a year; following appeal, two years.13' Regardless of convic-
tion, a pretrial restraining order substantially impairs both defendant and
third party property interests.
C. RICO Foifeiture Procedure
Review of RICO's procedural provisions is a relatively short exercise. 132
The indictment or information must describe any potentially forfeitable prop-
125. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 990-93 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 439
U.S. 810 (1978), reinstated in relevant part, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864
(1979).
126. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 809-10, reh'g. denied, 615 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
127. United States v. Marubeni Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 n.12 (9th Cir. 1980).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976).
129. See infra discussion at Section IV(D).
130. United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Spilo-
tro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (restraining order "flatly prevented [defendant] from dispos-
ing of his property or engaging in his business").
131. See e.g., United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant's prop-
erty restrained more than one year and likely to be restrained more than two years before final
verdict).
132. There are no procedural provisions within the text of the RICO statute. The only two
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erty interest1 33 and the jury must return a special verdict detailing the extent
of or interest in property subject to forfeiture.134 These two procedures repre-
sent all that Congress provided. There are no statutorily mandated procedures
to protect defendant and third party property interests prior to trial. While
providing for issuance of pretrial restraining orders, Congress failed to require
a hearing, and did not set forth standards to determine the propriety of these
orders. After trial the jury is required to consider in the same deliberation the
guilt of the defendant and the scope of a special forfeiture verdict. At no time
is the defendant afforded an opportunity, aside from his defense on the merits,
to protect his assets from ultimate deprivation. More importantly, third par-
ties currently have no right to intervene prior to the forfeiture verdict to de-
fend their property interests from wrongful deprivation. Rather, Congress
simply set forth two catch-all provisions: 18 U.S.C. section 1963(c) states:
(1) "All provisions of law relating to the disposition of property. . for viola-
tion of the customs laws. . shall be applied to forfeitures incurred, or alleged
to have been incurred, under the provisions of [RICO], insofar as applicable
and not inconsistent with the provisions hereof'; and (2) "The United States
shall dispose of all property as soon as commercially feasible, making due
provision for the rights of innocent persons." 13
5
This, then, is the problem: contemporary customs laws derive from the
same English Navigation Acts and federal admiralty laws earlier discussed.
136
Customs procedures are in rem, not in personam-forfeiture stems from the
guilt of the property, not the person; and third parties, or "innocent persons,"
have no substantive rights.137 Indeed, for third parties the only arguable re-
course provides no remedy at all: an unreviewable administrative plea to an
apparently unmerciful Attorney General 138 for remission and mitigation of
forfeiture. In rem and in personam procedures, legally and historically, are
strangers; in rem procedures cannot be applied to effectuate an in personam
forfeiture.
Exacerbating the confusion is the silence of the legislative history, a some-
what surprising occurrence given the high likelihood that property sought by
the government may be owned jointly by innocent nonparticipants to the
criminal proceedings. 139 A formidable preliminary consideration in determin-
forfeiture procedures are contained in subsequent amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
133. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 7(c)(2).
134. See FED. R. CiuM. P. 31(e).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976).
136. See supra notes 30-41, 74-77 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 30-95 and accompanying text.
138. See United States v. Edwards, 368 F.2d 722, 724 (4th Cir. 1966) ("It is the invariable
policy of the Treasury Secretary to deny such claims for remission of forfeiture and.. . such
policy is formalized in a procedural manual which is said to be accessible to neither counsel for
taxpayer nor to the United States Attorney.").
139. The legislative history of the forfeiture statute also fails to disclose any concern on the
part of the 91st Congress for third party property interests sufficient to identify procedures for
protecting their interests. The only colloquy concerning the negative consequences that might
befall "innocent parties--that is, members or partners of a legitimate business," House Hearings,
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ing procedural rights under RICO is the extent to which in rem customs proce-
dures may be applied to an in personam, criminal forfeiture under the
racketeering statute.
There are four possible approaches to implement congressional intent to
integrate customs laws with RICO forfeiture procedures. One approach, sup-
ported by some legislative history, relegates the defendant and third parties to
the administrative customs laws remedies only after forfeiture of the property;
that is, after a final judgment of forfeiture is entered. 140 This view, however,
renders the customs laws irrelevant to the key issue of the appropriate forfei-
ture procedures prior to entry of judgment. A second approach, adopted by
one court, 141 focuses on the in personam character of the racketeering pro-
ceedings and reasons that absent a finding of guilt, the customs laws cannot
authorize any property deprivation. Again, however, the customs laws remain
procedurally irrelevant until entry of a final finding of forfeitability.
A third approach resolves the issue of the role of the customs laws by
resort to recent precedent in the in rem forfeiture area.142 The Second Circuit
recently announced that exhaustion of the customs law remedy of mitigation
and remission is not essential to acquiring judicial relief: "We do not believe
that the district court's jurisdiction to review a Fifth Amendment claim of con-
stitutional deprivation may be entirely precluded regardless of the fact that an
administrative remedy does exist." 143 If the presence of customs law adminis-
trative remedies does not prevent judicial relief for in rem forfeitures, then
certainly the customs laws should not bar pursuit of judicial review for in per-
sonam forfeitures. This approach, nonetheless, does not help clarify when
judicial review applies to a RICO forfeiture proceeding.
supra note 103, at 665, arose in relation to 18 U.S.C. § 1967 (1976). Section 1967 simply leaves it
to the discretion of the trial court whether to close from the public "any proceeding ancillary to or
in any civil action instituted by the United States under this Chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 1967 (1976).
During the House Hearings on RICO, the Justice Department came out in favor of an amendment
to Section 1967 that would leave it to the discretion of the trial court whether to open or close the
ancillary proceedings to the public. House Hearings, supra note 103, at 665-66. Thus, when the
general counsel of the House Judiciary Subcommittee expressed concern over the ill effects that
public disclosure would have on innocent associates of the defendant during RICO proceedings,
the Justice Department supported the amendment that would leave closure to the "common
sense" of the judiciary on a case-by-case basis. House Hearings, supra note 103, at 665-66. Be-
yond this bow to the "commonsense" use of court discretion in determining whether innocent
parties' interests should be protected by closing RICO proceedings from the public, the 91st Con-
gress failed to specify adequately what procedures were to be followed in effecting a forfeiture
under the racketeering statute.
140. S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 160 (1970) ("Sub-section c provides rules governing
forfeited property. In general, it incorporates by reference the long-tested customs law provi-
sions." [emphasis added]). Support for this view can be found in the provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1963
(1976), which requires the United States to make "due provision for the rights of innocent per-
sons." Until the defendant is convicted he is presumed innocent, and "due provision" must be
made for him. Upon conviction, he is no longer "innocent," and the customs laws then arguably
apply.
141. United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 280 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon II).
142. United States v. One Tintoretto Painting, Etc., 691 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1982).
143. Id at 609. See also United States v. $8,850, 103 S. Ct. 2005 (1983) (court stated in dicta
that "[a] claimant need not waive his right to a prompt judicial hearing simply because he selks




A final approach--offered by this Article-recognizes that regardless of
the applicability of the customs laws, the Constitution provides certain guar-
antees that must be accorded property owners, whether third parties or de-
fendants. On the other hand, the racketeering statute embodies a specific
theory of forfeiture that must be afforded meaning. To the degree that cus-
toms laws are inconsistent with the Constitution, the Constitution obviously
prevails; to the extent that customs laws are irreconcilable with the in per-
sonam nature of a RICO forfeiture, the statutory, in personam rationale
prevails. This is not to say, however, that the customs laws are of no value in
identifying appropriate procedures for RICO forfeitures. Rather, when these
laws do not tread upon accepted constitutional standards and are consistent
with the basic features of in personam forfeiture, they should be viewed not
only as a potential guide for interpretation but also as legislative choices.
The next section deals with the procedures demanded by the Constitution
to protect defendants and third parties from wrongful deprivation of property
under RICO's forfeiture provisions.
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN GENERAL
Identifying the demands of procedural due process in the context of in
personam forfeitures is no more difficult than in other areas of application.
Generally speaking, two familiar issues characterize due process jurispru-
dence. The first question asks whether "life, liberty, or property" is affected by
government action.144 The second inquiry determines the form of process
due.145
A. Deprivation of Property
RICO forfeits a defendant's interest in property. "Property" is defined by
state common law and state statutes;146 there is no federal law of property.1
47
State statutory law, for example, charters corporations and partnerships, while
state common law enforces tenancies, liens and the like. State law may also
recognize particularly novel types of assets as enforceable property rights sub-
ject to the due process clause. Old or new, if the particular interest sought to
be forfeited is an enforceable right under state law, these assets are accorded
constitutional protection.'
4 8
144. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
145. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
146. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property interests, of course, are not
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such are state law.").
147. On the other hand, there is a growing recognition of property interests in federally-cre-
ated entitlements. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
148. Because there is no federal common law of property, if a particular asset comes within
the purview of the racketeering statute, the government cannot fail to recognize state enforced
property attributes. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974) ("the definition of
property rights is a matter of state law"). If, for example, the government acquires a defendant's
majority interest in a state-created corporation, the government cannot fail to recognize and as-
sume the state-enforced fiduciary obligations incident to property ownership.
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Obviously, forfeiture "deprives" a defendant, a third party, and perhaps
even a racketeering victim 14 9 of property. Equally significant, however, is the
government's attempt to restrain potentially forfeitable property in advance of
trial.150 Pretrial restrictions not only cut off the traditional property rights of
alienability and enjoyment but also cause significant economic damage, in-
cluding depreciation, lost investment opportunities, and impairment of good-
will and credit. A pretrial restraining order thus deprives both a defendaow
and third parties of "continued possession and use of the goods." 151 Hence,
due process protections apply here as well. Moreover, the temporary nature of
the pretrial interference with the use of property in no way diminishes the
necessity to observe due process: 152 'The Court's view has been that as long
as a property deprivation is not de minimus, its gravity is irrelevant to whether
account must be taken of the Due Process Clause."'
153
One further matter must be addressed before considering the general con-
tours of what process is "due" property rights deprived in RICO forfeiture
proceedings. An argument can be made that "property" rights traditionally
have been accorded second class status in the hierarchy of procedural due
process protections. While the fifth and fourteenth amendments fail to differ-
entiate among the terms "life, liberty, or property," under some circumstances
the judiciary has afforded fewer due process guarantees to "mere" property
rights as opposed to personal rights. 154 Moreover, some Supreme Court deci-
sions imply that certain categories of "traditional" property deserve more due
process protection than others.'
55
149. RICO's statutory scheme provides treble damages recovery to racketeering victims
against defendants. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976). See generally, Strafer, Massumi, & Skolniek, Civil
RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody/r Darling," 19 AM. CtAM. L. REV. 655 (1982) (arguing
that the judicial limitations on the applicability of civil RICO are contrary to congressional in-
tent). In fact, Congress specifically stipulated that racketeering victims can collaterally estop a
convicted defendant's denial of civil liability. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1976). To the extent that a
defendant forfeits his property to the government, a racketeering victim can be denied this civil
statutory remedy.
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976).
151. United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972)).
152. North Ga. Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem. Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1972) ("But it is now well-settled that a temporary, non-final deprivation of
property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment"); United States
v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing North Ga. Finishing, Inc.).
153. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975).
154. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611
(1974); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950) ("It is sufficient, where
only property rights are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a
judicial determination."); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931) ("where only
property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial inquiry is not a denial of due
process, if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate.").
155. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, at 614-15 (1974) (limiting Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) to wages). But see North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419
U.S. 601, at 608 (1975) ('We are no more inclined now than we have been in the past to distin-
guish among different kinds of property in applying the Due Process Clause."); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972) ("The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of 'property' generally. . . . It is
not the business of a court adjudicating due process rights to make its own critical evaluation of
those choices and protect only the ones that, by its own lights, are 'necessary.' "). In large part this
attempt to hold some types of property, i.e., wages, out as more deserving of rigid due process
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A general response to those arguments is Justice Stewart's observation in
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.. 156 Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart
remarked:
The dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a
false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The
right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the
right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a 'personal' right,
whether the property in question be a welfare check, a home, or a
savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists be-
tween the personal right to liberty and the personal right to property.
Neither could have meaning without the other.
157
Two categories of property historically have been accorded diminished due
process protection. RICO forfeitures usually involve neither kind of property.
The first category is property so inherently injurious to the public that sum-
mary government action was deemed of paramount importance.158 Examples
include impure foods, 159 and misbranded articles of commerce. 160 Underly-
ing these decisions upholding deprivation of property prior to a hearing was a
determination that the need for speedy government action to protect the public
interest outweighed any private interest in obtaining the trappings of due pro-
cess prior to the property infringement. 161 In addition, the property owner's
interest was considered at least minimally protected against erroneous seizure
and injury by the availability of a post-seizure judicial remedy of damages.
162
The emergency rationale does not similarly support reducing the level of
due process protections applicable to property seized under RICO. There is
no need for swift action. The assets of a legitimate "enterprise," like the assets
of any other business, are not adulterated articles of commerce. 163 Conse-
quently, no public interest intrinsic to the property demands summary action.
Moreover, a wrongfully deprived RICO property owner, either a third party
or arguably the defendant, does not have even the token protection of postin-
fringement judicial review through an action for damages. There simply is no
"protection of last resort." For a third party there is no judicial review
whatsoever.
The second category of property afforded a diminished degree of due pro-
cess is property for which provision of preinfringement due process is either
protections is a reflection of a concern of certain Court members about the possible consequences
of extending the principles of the early procedural due process cases beyond their facts. See North
Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. DiChem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 615-16 (Blackmun & Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting).
156. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
157. Id at 522. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207, 207 n.22 (1977).
158. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 at 538-39 (1981).
159. North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
160. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 338 U.S. 594 (1950).
161. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538-39 (1981).
162. Id
163. In fact, it is the defendant, not the enterprise assets, that the government wishes to remove
from the stream of commerce. See United States v. Dean, 647 F.2d 779, 787 (8th Cir. 1981), rev'd
on other grounds, 667 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2296 (1982) (18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a) "does not directly refer to any forfeiture by the corrupted enterprise").
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impossible or for all purposes impractical. In Parratt v. Taylor 164 the Supreme
Court recognized that due process could not possibly be accorded prior to the
negligent deprivation of property. The impracticality of providing procedural
due process has also influenced the measure of protection accorded property
interests,' 65 particularly in deciding the appropriate level of procedural due
process prior to deprivation of government-created rights. 166 Nevertheless,
the impossibility or impracticality rationales have little relevance to RICO for-
feitures. To date, the number of RICO prosecutions is relatively nominal
compared to the numerous cases associated with deprivation of government
entitlements.167 Furnishing due process protections to affected property own-
ers in a RICO prosecution can hardly be considered sufficiently burdensome
to warrant dilution of fifth amendment guarantees.168
A RICO forfeiture thus deprives property owners of enforceable property
interests. The next question is what procedures are constitutionally required
to protect these property rights from wrongful deprivation.
B. The Process Due
Stated simply, the fifth amendment guarantees property owners affected
adversely by governmental action the right to notice 169 and an opportunity to
be heard.' 70 Beyond this rudimentary statement, however, the precise con-
tours of the right to notice and hearing are currently unclear. Procedural due
process generally encompasses several issues. The threshold question is one of
timing:' 71 whether a hearing is required before or after property deprivation.
After determining when a hearing is required, other procedural trappings must
164. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
165. See id at 539.
166. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
167. Compare White-Collar Crime: SecondAnnual Survey oLaw, 19 AM. CRIM L. REV. 173,
353, 353 n.1412 (1981) (in first eleven years of RICO's existence only 152 recorded RICO cases)
with Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Ma-
thews v. Eldridg" Three Factors in Search ofa Theor,y of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 31 n.9
(1976) (over 75,400 administrative hearings on disability claims held in the year 1975 alone).
168. Protection of property rights is only one of the two aims that procedural due process
seeks to achieve. Justice Frankfurter summarized this first objective in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951): "No better instrument has been devised for
arriving at truth than to give person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and
the opportunity to meet it." Justice Frankfurter also described a second, intrinsic aim of proce-
dural due process: "Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important to a
popular government, that justice has been done." Id at 22. For further discussion of the intrinsic
view of procedural due process, see Michelman, Formal andAssociationalAims in Procedural Due
Process, in DuE PRocEss 126 (Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philoso-
phy, 1977); Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the Right to bee Heard- The Signocance of Old Friends,
9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 449 (1974).
169. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1982); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
170. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Gannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914) ("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.").
171. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (hearing required prior to termina-
tion of public assistance benefits) with Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (hearing not
necessary prior to termination of social security benefits).
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be considered, including the neutrality of the factfinder,172 the adequacy of
notice, and the formality of the proceedings. 173 These latter issues, insofar as
they deal with particularized requirements of various stages of property depri-
vation, will be discussed at a later point. The key question, when a hearing is
required, is discussed first.
"For all its consequence," noted the Supreme Court recently, "due pro-
cess has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely'defined." 1 74 Thus,
"applying the due process clause is. .. an uncertain enterprise which must
discover what 'fundamental fairness' consists of in a particular situation by
considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests
that are at stake."'
' 75
The leading case of Mathews v. Eldridge17 6 provides precedent for the
timing of a hearing. In Eldridge the Court held that a hearing was not consti-
tutionally required prior to the termination of social security benefits. The
procedure in question afforded a hearing, but not until after a subsequent step
of administrative review, often occurring over a year later. The claimant ar-
gued that a post-deprivation hearing was constitutionally inadequate to ensure
a fair determination of his disability. The Court disagreed, indicating a will-
ingness to permit government deprivation of property pending final adjudica-
tion provided the process actually employed guards against erroneous
deprivation in light of the competing interests at stake.177 The standard of
evaluation considers "the private interests affected by the proceeding, the risk
of error created by the state's chosen procedure, and the countervailing gov-
ernmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure."
178
The "particular situation" of a RICO forfeiture involves two property
owners, the defendant and a third party. The defendant's interest in the enter-
prise, as set forth by the indictment, is forfeitable only upon a finding of guilt.
Both the defendant and the third party, however, are deprived of property
without a statutorily provided hearing at the issuance of a pretrial restraining
order for which the government may apply exparte. A third party is never
172. See Johnson v. American Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1978) (Wisdom, J.)
(summarizing Supreme Court due process cases as requiring judicial review of property
deprivations).
173. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 n.9 (1982) (outlining procedural issues inci-
dent to a hearing).
174. Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
175. Id at 24-25. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1972); Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) ("In determining what due process of law is, under the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments, the court must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding
existing in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, which
were shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted
on by them after the settlement of this country.").
176. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
177. See id. at 334-35. See also Kandaras, supra note 87, at 930.
178. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982) (paraphrasing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, at 335 (1976); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 247 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (quoting
Santosky).
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afforded an opportunity to argue against a wrongful deprivation of his prop-
erty before or after trial. Although the RICO defendant is granted some form
of a hearing by virtue of prosecution, he often must restrict his energies to
establishing a criminal defense. Thus, the defendant arguably is not offered a
meaningful opportunity to address a trier of fact strictly as a property owner,
as he might do before trial. The relevant questions that emerge are, first,
whether a hearing must be constitutionally afforded to both defendant and
third parties prior to issuance of a pretrial restraining order; and second,
whether a third party must be allowed a pre-forfeiture verdict argument before
the jury to protect property he believes is not forfeitable.
Applying the Eldridge requirements, it appears constitutionally ines-
capable that a hearing is required at both stages of prosecution. Before trial,
the private interest of both defendant and third party is significant. A pretrial
restraining order deprives continued use of business property for a substantial
period of time. Millions of dollars may be involved, with immediate adverse
economic consequences including asset depreciation, loss of investment oppor-
tunities and impairment of goodwill. Moreover, day-to-day management of
business is threatened with the Damocles sword of forfeiture at some indefinite
time in the future, causing financial institutions to retreat from extending
credit or investors from purchasing stock in the wake of the government's un-
certain claim of title. The stigma of a criminal racketeering prosecution obvi-
ously affects business expansion. 179 In the Eldridge calculus, then, the private
interest is great with respect to pretrial restraint of property.
After conviction, both defendant and third party face impending divesti-
ture. The jury issue, for which the defendant has his day in court, is the scope
of the enterprise and the defendant's participation therein. A third party, who
is not afforded a hearing, a fortiori has just as great a stake in appearing before
the jury in an attempt to limit forfeiture to the defendant's, not his own, inter-
est. If a RICO prosecution were a civil proceeding, third parties with interests
in the property would be deemed necessary to just adjudication of the mer-
its.' 80 They are no less indispensable here. Thus, at the post-conviction stage
private interests are strong as well.
The risk of erroneous deprivation of property is especially great in a
RICO forfeiture prosecution. RICO, unlike any other provision of the crimi-
nal law, requires proof not only of substantive offenses but also of a pattern of
"racketeering activity" affecting an "enterprise." The complexity of the statute
alone raises the risk of error with respect to a defendant's guilt.' 8 ' A RICO
forfeiture case is "extremely 'complicated,' "s182 requiring prosecutors to have
179. See infra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing stigma associated with
racketeering).
180. See United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 277 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon II).
181. United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 378 (5th Cir. 1981) (RICO cases extremely com-
plex, "characterized by lengthy indictments involving multiple defendants charged with diverse
criminal activity") rev'd on other grounds, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nora.
Russello v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 721 (1983).
182. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 248 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon 1) (quoting Report of
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"a degree of financial expertise which is in general not available."' 8 3 In fash-
ioning the indictment, the prosecutor undertakes a complex economic calcula-
tion in alleging the extent of the defendant's interest in the enterprise subject
to forfeiture. Needless to say, neither third party nor defendant provides input
into this determination.
Specifically, pretrial restraining orders currently are issued without refer-
ence to statutory standards; the determination "literally breathes the spirit of
discretion."' 184 A proper exercise of discretion necessarily depends upon the
sufficiency of the information before the court.' 85 The only representation
statutorily required, however, is the government's. Moreover, the govern-
ment's representations frequently consist of no more than the unproven allega-
tions in a grand jury indictment. Defendant and third party without doubt
possess a different perspective with regard to the RICO charges, the alleged
scope of forfeiture, and the need for pretrial restraint of property. Both may
be able to provide information to rebut as legally overbroad the scope of the
restraining order or show that the chance of asset dissipation is too low to
warrant restraint of property. Without their participation, however, the court
is left to decide the propriety of pretrial restraint based only upon the govern-
ment's point of view, in a highly complicated RICO forfeiture prosecution.
8 6
The risk of an erroneous order is evident.
Similarly, after conviction the chance that the jury will incorrectly deter-
mine the defendant's interest in the enterprise is multiplied without third party
participation. A secured party, shareholder, partner, joint venturer or co-ten-
ant could provide the jury with information particularly within that person's
purview delimiting property interests belonging to them, not the defendant.
Without this evidence, the risk of wrongful forfeiture to the government of
property owned by a third party is great.
The third criterion of Eldridge is the government interest at stake. A pre-
trial restraining order prevents the defendant from frustrating the effectiveness
of forfeiture by disposing of property before conviction. 187 This goal is un-
questionably important. Nonetheless, its accommodation does not mean that
a hearing cannot be granted before trial. In particular cases in which the dan-
ger of swift asset dissipation is great, the government may obtain an exparte
restraining order, and then provide defendant and third party a prompt hear-
ing to challenge its propriety. 88 In this way, the government's interest is satis-
the Comptroller General of the United States, "Asset Forfeiture-Seldom Used Tool in Combating
Drug Trafficking" 23 (April 10, 1981)).
183. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 248 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon I).
184. Id at 243.
185. See id at 243 n.3. The court stated: "A judicial exercise of discretion is ex consulto.
That is, it should be an informed decision, reached after consultation and in conformance with the
general principles of applicable law." Id
186. Even if the court were to base its decision solely on the government's unchallenged alle-
gations, the government is itself in a poor position to know the extent of the defendant's property
interests because of the applicability of the restricted rules of criminal discovery. Cf Id. at 248.
187. United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 683 (D. Md. 1976).
188. See infra notes 195-205 and accompanying text (discussion ofexparte orders).
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fled and, at the same time, the risk of an erroneous pretrial order is reduced.
Given the obvious efficacy of this simple procedural alternative, the govern-
ment's interest cannot be termed overriding.
After conviction, the government's interest is twofold. First, the govern-
ment seeks to further the purposes of RICO forfeiture: punishment and sepa-
ration of the racketeer from the enterprise. As to these purposes, the
government "registers no gain toward its declared goals"'189 when it punishes a
third party through erroneous forfeiture. Second, the government has an af-
firmative statutory obligation to "make due provision for the rights of inno-
cent person."'190 This responsibility is, of course, antithetical to use of
procedures that might deprive a third party of property.' 9 ' Hence, one gov-
ernment objective is in fact served by permitting a third party to protect his
assets though post-conviction argument before the jury. Post-conviction, the
government's interest in not affording third parties an opportunity to be heard
is weak.
On balance, the private interests of defendant and third party in prevent-
ing erroneous forfeiture, either from pretrial restraint or jury verdict, is great.
Both before and after trial the risk of error, given the racketeering statute's
complexity and the complicated process of effectuating the forfeiture, is signifi-
cant. In contrast, the government's interest is slight, given the availability of
exparte orders and its obligation to protect the rights of third parties. More-
over, the "probable value" of "additional procedural safeguards"' 192 (e.g., a
hearing) immeasurably strengthens the assurance that a pretrial restraining or-
der is properly entered and jury verdict properly rendered. Thus, a pretrial
hearing, either before 93 or immediately following 194 issuance of a restraining
order, is constitutionally required. Affected third parties must also be allowed
to participate in the post-conviction determination of forfeiture.
This Article proposes, therefore, that a hearing is constitutionally re-
quired at two points prior to a final verdict of forfeiture. First, a hearing must
be held before issuance of any pretrial restraining order, to provide both the
defendant and affected third parties an opportunity to prevent constraints on
their assets pending the ultimate forfeiture determination, if any. Second, af-
ter a finding of guilt, a separate hearing is required to provide third parties the
right to intervene and present evidence and argument regarding the proposed
189. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767 (1982) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
652 (1972).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976). Although the government's statutory obligation to "innocent
persons" does not arise until after conviction, were the government to wait until forfeiture in order
to protect these parties the post-conviction remedy would be substantially impaired.
191. See United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D. Md. 1981) ("Attorney General
has the express statutory responsibility to provide for the rights of innocent persons effected by a
forfeiture order as well as the more general obligation to insure that the laws of the United States
are enforced in a constitutional manner"), aff'd mem. and remanded, 705 F.2d 445, 445, 446 (4th
Cir. 1983).
192. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, at 335 (1976).
193. See United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981).
194. See United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Crozier,
674 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982).
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forfeiture verdict and the extent to which their assets lie outside its scope. This
separate hearing also affords the defendant his first meaningful opportunity to
protect his assets from wrongful deprivation. A discussion of the procedural
trappings of these hearings must wait until their substantive content is
considered.
IV. PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
4. Ex Parte Restraining Orders
The government in RICO prosecutions frequently applies ex parte for
pretrial restraining orders. The lack of notice and hearing for both the defend-
ant and the third parties has troubled several courts. 195 Balanced against the
property interests of the defendant and third parties, however, is the govern-
ment's legitimate objective in blocking dissipation of forfeitable assets prior to
judgment. Absent a restraining order, the defendant may concoct numerous
means to deprive the government of its spoils. 19 6 RICO's legislative history
indicates that Congress drafted section 1963(b) to prevent just such behav-
ior.' 97 Manifestly, any procedures employed to accommodate rights of prop-
erty owners also must consider the government's interest in preservation of a
property judgment, to the extent permitted by the Constitution. Mindful of
these concerns, this Article attempts to place four corners on constitutionally
mandated procedures for entrance of restraining orders prior to a RICO trial
on the merits.
Whether a court should entertain ex parte applications for pretrial re-
straining orders at all is the first question. Neither the statute nor the legisla-
tive history offers guidance. The statute simply grants to federal courts
jurisdiction to enter restraining orders "or take such other actions . . . as it
shall deem proper,"'198 and the legislative history is silent. Generally speak-
ing, although exparte restraining orders are no stranger to the law,199 they are
disfavored absent a clear showing of exigencies that make the provision of
adversarial proceedings infeasible.2° ° Even then, courts usually promptly
grant an opportunity for affected parties to challenge the applicant's represen-
tations.20 1 Drawing upon established exparte motions practice, courts have
looked to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in addressing the showing nec-
195. See, e.g., United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 280 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon II); United
States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 683 (D. Md. 1976). But see United States v. Long, 654 F.2d
911, 916-17 (3d Cir. 1981) (illegal proceeds transferred to knowing third party).
196. One court has also stated erroneously that the court itself has an interest in restraining the
assets in order to preserve its jurisdiction over the assets for possible inclusion in a final judgment.
See United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 243 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon I). Jurisdiction over the
assets in an in personam forfeiture proceeding is unnecessary because the court plainly has per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant.
197. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1970); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
160 (1969).
198. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976).
199. See FED. R. Clv. P. 65(b).
200. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65 advisory committee notes (1966 amendment).
201. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (ten days).
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essary to obtain an exparte RICO restraining order.202 In particular, courts
have compared the government's exparte application to a request for a tempo-
rary restraining order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b).20 3 Going
further, these courts have also required that a prompt hearing follow issuance
of an exparte order, similar to the hearing afforded after a motion for a tem-
porary restraining order.
2°4
Although adoption of these civil procedural rules has helped to resolve a
number of ambiguities in the forfeiture statute, more fundamental constitu-
tional questions are at stake. Regardless of these procedural provisions, a
RICO defendant's rights to a prompt hearing after entry of an ex parte re-
straining order is required by the due process clause.20 5 Indeed, a more force-
ful constitutional argument can be found for affording an immediate hearing
to affected third parties who, after all, have not been accorded even the mini-
mal protections of a probable cause determination by a grand jury. In short,
as a constitutional matter, the government must, at a hearing, make a prima
facie showing that the defendant will attempt to spirit away assets in the ab-
sence of a court-enforced restraining order.
B. Content of the Hearing
Whether held before or after issuance of the ex parte restraining order,
the purpose of the pretrial hearing is largely the same: to force the govern-
ment to proffer evidence supporting pretrial restrictions on the use and aliena-
bility of property. Equally important, the hearing affords the defendant and
affected third parties the opportunity to challenge the government's conten-
tions through legal arguments and evidence. Of course, there is a chance that
the pretrial hearing may turn into a minitrial.2°6 This risk is diminished, how-
ever, if the court confines the parties to the limited issues they are in a position
to address. 207 The government must introduce evidence that (a) the defend-
ant's conviction is likely, (b) the assets listed in the indictment are subject to
forfeiture upon conviction,208 and (c) absent a restraining order the defendant
is likely to dissipate these assets. 20 9 Only the defendant is in a position to
202. See, e.g., United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting United
States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982)).
203. See, e.g., United States v. States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 240-41 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon I); United States v. Mandel, 408
F. Supp. 679, 682 (D. Md. 1976).
204. See supra note 203.
205. Cf Kandaras, supra note 87.
206. See United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Veon,
538 F. Supp. 237, 245 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon I).
207. Limiting the parties to narrow issues is not an unusual procedure. See generally FED. R.
CRiM. P. 17.1; FED. R. Civ. P. 16. Parties have traditionally made limited appearances before
courts prior to trial solely to discuss, for example, questions of personal jurisdiction. See Metzger
v. Turner, 195 Okla. 406, 158 P.2d 701 (1945); Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1, 132
S.E.2d 18 (1963).
208. United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Crozier, 674
F.2d 1293, at 1298 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981).
209. United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 683 (D. Md. 1976). Contra United States v.
Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 618 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) (government need not make independent showing
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rebut the government's evidence on the likelihood of a guilty verdict.210 Third
parties must relegate their arguments to the discrete property issues before the
court. As a result, a third party as well as the defendant could dispute the
government's allegations whether a particular asset is legally or factually sub-
ject to forfeiture. 211 Both parties could also address the dissipation question,
providing input regarding the relative fungibility of the assets, significant mar-
ket conditions substantially influencing preservation of asset value, and third
party control rendering preconviction transfer unlikely.212 If the court con-
fines the individual parties to these separable issues, expenditure of pretrial
hearing time can be kept to a minimum.
The government bears the initial burden of production in justifying pre-
trial restraints, for several reasons. Before a jury verdict the government has
no legal interest in the property,2 13 and can hardly claim a right of restraint
subject only to rebuttal by the party in fact possessing legal title. Rather, the
government analogically stands in the shoes of a civil party seeking injunctive
relief who, as the movant, shoulders the burden ofjustifying changes from the
status quo.2 14 In meeting this burden, the government cannot rely solely on
the unproven allegations in the indictment.2 15 A grand jury finding of prob-
able cause is no substitute for an affirmative proffer of evidence of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Nor is the mere listing of assets in an indictment
sufficient to show substantive forfeitability or probable dissipation. On these
issues as well the government must present not charges, but evidence. Dis-
cerning the quantum of evidence required is a different question discussed
later.
In the eyes of a third party, the primary purpose of a pretrial hearing is to
present factual or legal arguments for excluding his property interests from
any restraining order that may issue in the criminal prosecution. A legal de-
fense might be that a particular asset is not part of the enterprise alleged in the
regarding likely transfer of assets by defendant where property such as jewels are readily "con-
cealed, removed, or disposed of through licit or illicit means.").
210. Third parties lack standing to make arguments concerning the defendant's likely guilt.
For a brief discussion of standing, see United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 276 (E.D. Cal.
1982) (Veon II).
211. See infra notes 266-299 and accompanying text (discussing substantive restrictions on
forfeiture).
212. One court noted the problems inherent in not having the affected parties on record:
Persons other than those named as defendants in this case apparently own property or
other interests in the enterprises listed in the indictment, but it does not appear from the
record whether a court order restraining the transfer or other disposition of the defend-
ant's alleged interests would impair the value or use of other parties' interests. The
Court thus cannot say from the record whether or not third parties would be harmed.
United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 683 (D. Md. 1976). After all, if market conditions
impair the value of the frozen assets, all parties, including the government, suffer economic injury.
213. United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon II).
214. See Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callay, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974).
215. United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Crozier, 674
F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982) ("A grand jury determination is not an adequate substitute for an
adversary proceeding because a defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and the
government does not assume the burden of proof."); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d
Cir. 1981).
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indictment. A factual defense could be made by showing that the asset in
question was transferred pre-indictment from the defendant to the third party.
In general, a third party rebuts the government's evidence of potentially for-
feitable third party property by furnishing proof that specific assets are not
within the substantive reach of RICO or cannot be forfeited in light of factual
evidence not previously presented to the grand jury or the court.216 The third
party's contentions can then be considered by the trial judge in fashioning the
scope of the restraining order.
In addition, a third party may wish to produce evidence concerning the
likelihood that the defendant will transfer or waste assets before an adjudica-
tion of guilt. Although lacking an interest in either the defendant's property or
his guilt, a third party may be in a position to control or limit the possibility of
asset dissipation by the defendant. If so, unnecessary and disadvantageous
restrictions should not saddle the use of third party property. Other considera-
tions, including the impossibility or impracticality of dissipation on the part of
the defendant, could also be argued by third parties. Finally, ranking as a
crucial third party concern is the making of an adequate record of their inter-
ests in property identified by the government as potentially forfeitable.217 By
so doing, a third party preserves claims for future argument to the judge or
jury regarding the scope of any forfeiture ultimately entered.
The defendant is interested not only in presenting evidence of property
rights improperly listed in the indictment but also in rebutting the govern-
ment's contention that a guilty verdict is likely. Although challenges to guilt
pose the greatest risk of unduly expanding the pretrial hearing, carefully re-
stricting the defendant to specific responses to the government's allegations
should reduce the length of argument. More importantly, as will be seen, the
quantum of evidence the government must produce to obtain a restraining
order is lower than that which is necessary to obtain a verdict of guilty.
218
Furthermore, as the moving party the government determines the amount of
evidence used to seek a pretrial restraining order. As a practical matter, the
government's desire to obtain pretrial property restraints will be tempered by
an analysis of the strengths of its case. The weaker the prosecution, the greater
will be the quantity of evidence necessary to support application for an order.
Should the government prefer not to produce the required evidence, it can
always forego seeking a restraining order. At any rate, carefully restricting the
defendant to rebuttal of the government's proof on the probabilities of guilt,
forfeiture, and dissipation will keep the pretrial hearing within reasonable
bounds. Whether a defendant chooses to present evidence in this regard may
depend upon the admissibility of his testimony at trial, a question of constitu-
tional implication.219
216. For a more specific discussion of "asset defense," see infra notes 266-295 and accompany-
ing text.
217. See supra note 212 (court concerned with making adequate record of third party
property).
218. See infra notes 221-245 and accompanying text.
219. An argument can be made that when a defendant testifies to prevent the government
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C. Burden of Proof. The Standard of Persuasion
The Supreme Court recently stated that:
Notice, summons, right to counsel, rules of evidence, and evidentiary
hearing are all procedures to place information before the fact-finder.
But only the standard of proof "instructs the factfnder concerning
the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions he draws from that information. 220
Establishing the burden of persuasion determines how the "risk of error will
be allocated." 221 In the context of a pretrial restraining order application the
court must, without statutory guidance, determine the standard of proof the
government is to meet. Although the burden of proof can be divided into the
burdens of production and persuasion, for reasons already mentioned the gov-
ernment necessarily bears the burden of production in seeking a pretrial re-
from restraining his property before trial, use immunity is constitutionally required. In Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the Supreme Court held that when a defendant testifies at a
pretrial hearing in order to assert a fourth amendment claim, the government may not use his
testimony against him at trial. Recognizing the "obvious" fact that "a defendant who knows that
his testimony may be admissible against him at trial will sometimes be deterred" from asserting
his fourth amendment claim, id at 392, the Court was unwilling to countenance the "undeniable
tension" between a defendant's fifth amendment right to remain silent and his fourth amendment
right to contest the validity of an illegal search or seizure. The Court therefore held that when a
defendant surrenders his privilege against self-incrimination and testifies at a pretrial proceeding
to obtain a benefit afforded by a provision of the Bill of Rights, "his testimony may not thereafter
be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt .... Id at 394.
One court has considered, in passing, the applicability of Simmons to a pretrial RICO pro-
ceeding. In United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 276-77 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon II), defendant
moved to contest a lispendens the government had filed on his property prior to trial. At oral
argument his counsel asserted defendant's ownership in the property in order to rebut the govern-
ment's contention that defendant lacked standing to object. In holding that defendant did have
standing to object to pretrial restraint of his property, the court noted that defendant's reluctance
to admit an ownership interest was "understandable." Citing Simmons, the court stated that it
seemed "clear" that counsel's statements on behalf of the defendant "were made only for the
purposes of the motion now under consideration." Id at 277 n.8.
The Veon II court's dictum in construing Simmons is supported by considering the practical
effect of a pretrial restraining order. The government, through a RICO prosecution, may unjustly
deprive a defendant of property for years. United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir.
1982). Preventing its alienation and restricting its use, the government effectively "seizes" the
defendant's property. When the government lacks sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt or
when specific assets are not within the substance of RICO, the government's seizure is "unreason-
able." Against these governmental actions the defendant has recourse under the fourth amend-
ment: either a motion to suppress or a motion for return of property. See Imperial Distribs., Inc.
v. United States, 617 F.2d 892, 895 (Ist Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1981) (no difference
between the two motions under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)). Under Simmons, a defendant's testimony
at a hearing on a motion to suppress is inadmissible at trial. Eg., United States v. Boston, 510
F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 990 (1975); see generally, Note, Resol'ing Tensions
Between Constitutional Rights: Use Immunity in Concurrent or Related Proceedings, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 674, 694, 696 (1976) (lower courts "have accepted and applied Simmons enthusiastically in
the context of pretrial hearings"). In a RICO prosecution where a defendant must assert a posses-
sory interest in potentially forfeitable property in order to oppose the government's motion to
seize his property through a pretrial restraining order, the result is no different. Veon II, 549 F.
Supp. at 277 n.8; see generally United States v. Dohm, 597 F.2d 535, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1979)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) (reviewing "vast body" of law broadly construing Simmons), rev'd on
other grounds, 618 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir. 1980) (en banc).
220. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 n.9 (1982) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370
(1970).
.221. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982).
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straining order; the question is the appropriate standard attached to burden of
persuasion. According to recent Supreme Court precedent,222 this analysis
follows the three part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.223
Generally speaking, three separate standards are used to characterize the
burden of persuasion: proof beyond a reasonable doubt, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, and by a preponderance of the evidence. 224 Three courts have
determined the appropriate standard necessary to issue a restraining order for
in personam forfeiture cases. Two circuit courts have endorsed the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard 225 and one district court recently adopted the pre-
ponderance of the evidence test.226 A more thorough examination of the three
Eldridge factors, indicates that the intermediate standard of clear and convinc-
ing evidence is constitutionally appropriate.
The Supreme Court adopted the Eldridge test for establishing the stan-
dard of proof required by the due process clause in Addington v. Texas.
227
Addington involved the question of the measure of proof constitutionally re-
quired "in a civil proceeding brought under state law to commit an individual
involuntarily for an indefinite period to a state mental hospital. '228 Before
balancing the Eldridge factors, the Addington Court noted generally that be-
cause "society has a minimal concern over the outcome" of suits involving
monetary damages, "plaintiffs burden is a mere preponderance of the evi-
dence."229 Taken at face value, this observation indicates that the burden of
proof in a pretrial proceeding regarding the status of property rights should
also be a "mere preponderance." Careful attention to the reasoning of Adding-
ton, as placed in the context of the three Eldridge factors, counsels for a higher
burden of proof.
The first Eldridge factor, the private interest affected, is indeed significant
when a pretrial restraining order is used. Of course, mere property loss nor-
mally does not demand more than a preponderance standard. In assessing the
private interest of individuals at involuntary civil commitment proceedings,
however, theAddington Court accorded significance to the social "stigma" as-
sociated with such a factual finding.230 Similarly, because pretrial property
restraints in a RICO prosecution defacto establish a nexus to "racketeering
activity," a considerable stigma attaches to the defendant and third party
alike.231 Moreover, one of the reasons theAddington Court opted for a stan-
222. Id at 757; see Addingtion v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) ("We must be mindful that
the function of legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.").
223. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See supra text accompanying note 178.
224. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979).
225. United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Crozier, 674
F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3rd Cir. 1981).
226. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 248 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon I).
227. 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
228. Id at 419-20.
229. Id at 423.
230. Id at 426.
231. Cf Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 426-28 (1969); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 160-61 (1951) ("Petitioners are organizations which, on the face
of the record, are engaged solely in charitable or insurance activities. They have been designated
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dard lower than beyond reasonable doubt was that civil commitment is in no
sense a "punitive" exercise of government power.232 Imposition of a pretrial
restraining order, in contrast, is a necessary prelude to forfeiture, and forfei-
ture is clearly a punitive sanction. In short, the pretrial order not only affects
property interests, but judicially links the property of both the defendant and
third parties to racketeering, and represents, albeit prematurely, a punitive
sanction. The private interest of a defendant and a third party thereby rises
substantially above the mere pecuniary.
Even more relevant is the Addington Court's reasoning with respect to the
second Eldridge factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation. The Court held that
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is not required for civil commitment
proceedings because "continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment
to be corrected" are available at various stages of review.233 Under RICO,
there is no such parallel. Hence, it is the risk of erroneous deprivation, "as
applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions,"234 and as tempered
by a candid assessment whether a higher standard would increase the accuracy
of the factfinding process, 235 that is most compelling in establishing the appro-
priate burden of proof for issuance of a pretrial restraining order.
The risk of error differs for a third party and a defendant. A third party
runs the risk that the scope of a restraining order will exceed the property
finally obtained after conviction. Although a third party cannot be shielded
from the defendant's losses, at least he can be protected form unnecessary in-
fringements upon his own property rights. The procedure currently provided,
however, invites error. The scope of the restraining order is determined by the
terms of the indictment.3 6 In returning RICO indictments that often ap-
proach Rube Goldberg proportions, grand juries adopt unchallenged allega-
tions of the extent of the defendant's property interests. The government seeks
a restraining order based only upon the fact of the indictment or in conjunc-
tion with unchallenged supporting evidence. Given the complexity of the sub-
stantive and factual issues of a RICO prosecution, the risk that third parties
will be erroneously deprived of their interests must be considered substantial.
A second risk of error implicating third party interests results from an
erroneous finding of likely asset dissipation during the pendency of the crimi-
nal litigation. Restraints on property not transferable by the defendant are not
'communist' by the Attorney General of the United States .... It would be badness... not to
recognize that in the conditions of our time such designation drastically restricts the organization,
if it does not proscribe them. Potential members, contributors or beneficiaries of listed organiza-
tions may well be influenced by use of the designation .. "); R. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON
JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 703 (1982) (term "Communist labor leader racketeers" coined by
successful 1940 Texas candidate for U.S. Senate).
232. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428.
233. Id at 428-29.
234. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 (1982) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 344 (1976). Therefore, the risk of erroneous deprivation in ordering pretrial restrictions upon
property must be viewed in light of the complexity of RICO cases in general.
235. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 761 (1982) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976).
236. See FED. R. CGuM. P. 7(c); cf. United States v. Hall, 521 F.2d 406, 408 (9th Cir. 1975).
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only unnecessary, but also have adverse economic consequences for third par-
ties. On findings of both forfeitability and dissipation, then, a court imposing
pretrial restrictions runs a higher risk of causing injuries to third party prop-
erty interests.
As for the defendant, entry of a pretrial restraining order poses three pos-
sible risks of error. Along with the probability of error inherent in the com-
plex determination of forfeitability and the calculation of asset dissipation is
the enhanced opportunity for mistaken predictions concerning successful pros-
ecution under the sophisticated RICO statute. The chance for error in fash-
ioning pretrial restrictions of the defendant's property must also be considered
extreme.
Raising the government's burden of proof reduces the likelihood of erro-
neous pretrial restraints.237 Moving from a preponderance to a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard forces the government to adduce a greater quantity
of evidence to support a restraining order, and thus provides a more solid
foundation for an accurate judicial determination.
The third Eldridge factor in discerning the constitutionally appropriate
burden of persuasion is an assessment of the government's interests. In pre-
trial forfeiture proceedings, these interests are preserving potentially forfeita-
ble assets and minimizing costs associated with resolving property issues
collateral to the criminal prosecution. Preservation of forfeitable property is
indeed a substantial government interest, reflecting the intent of the 91st Con-
gress in enacting section 1963(b). The higher the government's burden of
proof, the greater the risk of impairing this objective. The second government
interest, minimizing costs of property adjudication, deserves little or no
weight. As the Supreme Court recently stated, "[u]nlike a constitutional re-
quirement of hearings, or court-appointed counsel, a stricter standard of proof
would reduce factual error without imposing substantial fiscal burdens on the
State....."238 Similarly, "[n]or would an elevated standard of proof create
any real administrative burdens for the judicial] factfinders." 239 The pretrial
triers of fact are federal judges, considerably familiar with elevated eviden-
tiary standards. In short, then, the sole compelling government interest at
stake in setting the burden of proof for issuance of a pretrial restraining order
is avoiding asset dissipation. This objective, moreover, is obviously irrelevant
with respect to third party assets.
In balancing the three Eldridge factors to determine the constitutionally
appropriate burden of persuasion, the overriding issue is what party shall ulti-
mately bear the risk of error. "The individual," the Supreme Court has said,
"should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the
possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm
to the state."24° The private interest affected by RICO pretrial property re-
237. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, at 764 (1982).
238. Id at 767.
239. Id
240. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427 (1979).
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straints is, on the one hand, substantial, including direct economic harm, the
stigma of a racketeering prosecution, and imposition of punitive sanctions. On
the other hand, pretrial property infringement is temporary.241 As for the risk
of error, a RICO prosecution and forfeiture determination is undoubtedly
complex. While the defendant has at least some protection from unfounded
government action through the office of the grand jury, a third party has none,
save a pretrial hearing. Given this high risk of erroneous deprivation and the
greater than pecuniary interests at stake, the preponderance standard does not
adequately accommodate society's interest in preserving property from unwar-
ranted government restraint. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard, how-
ever, may be too high. Reflecting society's qualitative judgment regarding the
evidence produced, this standard has been confined to final determinations
and further reserved for decisions for which "the social cost of even occasional
error is sizable." 242 Moreover, the decision to enter a pretrial restraining order
can only be based upon probabilities, a criteria not generally susceptible to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.24 3 Additionally, the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard significantly increases the quantity of evidence the government
must disclose. To the extent the government is forced to forego pretrial re-
straining orders because of tactical concerns over discovery, its interest in
avoiding dissipation is denied.
A standard of clear and convincing evidence provides a more appropriate
constitutional equilibrium for these competing interests. 244 This middle tier
measure of persuasion is frequently associated with civil fraud allegations,
245
proceedings more analogous to the stigma of racketeering and the property
infringements of a pretrial restraining order than is a simple damages dispute
between private parties. Finally, the clear and convincing evidence standard
places the risk of error on the government, which accordingly must proffer
241. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419
U.S. 601, 606 (1975) ("the length or severity of a deprivation of use or possession would be an-
other factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing"); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 86 (1972).
242. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, at 766 (1982).
243. Cf. Addington, 441 U.S. at 429 (1979).
244. See United States v. Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (adopting a clear and
convincing standard for pretrial restraining orders in RICO cases). The clear and convincing
standard has become even more compelling in the wake of the Seventh Circuit's decision in
United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 289 n.6 (7th Cir. 1983), in which the court indicated
that the government's title to forfeit assets would relate back from the date of verdict to the date a
pretrial restraining order was entered. Apparently the McManigal court considered that a judge's
pretrial assessment of the likely guilt of the defendant was sufficient to support the relation back of
the government's title from the date of judgement to the date the pretrial restraining order was
entered. While this dicta is undoubtedly incorrect the fact remains that if courts follow this dicta
the stakes are sufficiently increased to warrant shifting the burden of proof to the clear and con-
vincing standard. Ironically, the district court in Beckham, while adopting the clear and convinc-
ing standard, went on to hold that it could and should not make a pretrial guess on the likelihood
of any particular defendant's chances of conviction for purposes of issuing pretrial restraining
orders.
245. DeBry v. Transamerica Corp., 601 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1979); Merit Ins. Co. v. Colao, 603
F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980); Ajax Hardware Mfg. Corp. v. Industrial
Plants Corp., 569 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1977).
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enough evidence to reduce the risk of an erroneous determination without
having to try its case at the pretrial hearing.
D. Judicial Relief
Having determined the issues to be resolved along with appropriate stan-
dard of proof, the question remains what the court may do at the pretrial hear-
ing to protect defendant and third party property interests. A court addressing
the propriety of a restraining order must, by definition, employ discretion in
fashioning equitable relief. Beyond outright denial of the government's appli-
cation, the court could formulate various orders to accommodate the factual
findings made at the pretrial hearing. The court could, for example, amend
the indictment to exclude property belonging to third parties or otherwise im-
properly listed as owned by the defendant himself.246 The court could also
appoint a receiver, acceptable to the parties, to minimize the risk of interim
economic injury posed by direct restraints. Another possible safeguard might
entail judicial acceptance of an agreement by third party co-owners to hold the
defendant's property in trust until the criminal trial is completed. Other prop-
erty management options also may be selected in the exercise of the court's
equitable discretion.
The final issue is the constitutionally required procedural safeguards nec-
essary to facilitate full and fair judicial resolution of these issues. Before ad-
dressing these procedures, one preliminary observation is necessary. Even
prior to the government's application for a pretrial restraining order, both the
defendant and a third party incur a measurable injury to their property rights
from the mere return of the indictment. An indictment is a public record in-
forming all the world, and specifically the business community, that the prop-
erty described is considered subject to forfeiture. Significant economic
consequences may result swiftly. Secured parties may feel sufficiently insecure
to claim default, professional associates may presume derailment of the ordi-
nary course of business signaling the end of commercial dealings, and the
good will once garnered by the defendant and third party as property owners
in the financial community may evaporate. Constitutional protections ac-
corded property owners in a RICO prosecution therefore must attach prior to
the government's application for a pretrial restraining order. Upon issuance
of an indictment, the Constitution requires that notice and a hearing be pro-
vided to all affected property owners, even if the government does not seek a
pretrial restraining order. The defendant and the third party may then at least
challenge the legal sufficiency of forfeiture as set forth in the indictment. Ad-
ditionally, third parties may reserve with the court a seat at jury argument in
post-conviction proceedings.
246. A trial court always has authority to strike defects in an indictment. See FED. R. CIuM.
P. 12(b)(1) & (2).
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E. Procedural Due Process Application to Pretrial Proceedings
(1) Notice
Under the guidance of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. ,247
adequate notice for due process purposes is "notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action."248 A key factor is timing. Notice must not only be reasonably
tendered but also provided at a point calculated to afford a meaningful oppor-
tunity to respond. 249 In the context of RICO in personam forfeitures, this
standard signifies that notice to affected property owners should be tendered at
indictment, when official notice is afforded to the defendant.
Before trial, notice must not only inform affected property owners that
their property may be subject to government confiscation but more impor-
tantly should indicate any governmental intent to restrain its use during the
pendency of the litigation. Notice thus allows affected property owners the
opportunity to assess any possible injury that may result regardless of the
eventual outcome of the criminal trial. Finally, notice preserves the property
owner's ability to persuade the court to curb the breadth of the pretrial re-
straining order as well as to impose possible interim property management
mechanisms. Adequate notice is therefore crucial if property owners are to act
either to preserve valid property claims or take measures to minimize eco-
nomic risks within the framework of applicable court orders.
In addition to timeliness, notice must be broad enough reasonably to ap-
prise persons with significant assets of the possibility of loss. 250 At some point,
of course, the property interests involved may approach the de minimus level.
Due process does not compel burdensome efforts to notify all conceivable
property owners whose interests may be touched. Rather, Mullane posits no
greater requirement than use of reasonable efforts to notify property owners
reasonably susceptible of identification. Certain types of realty and chattel,
for example, may have become matters of public record through various title
recording requirements.25' If so, the government reasonably would be re-
quired to give notice to record title owners prior to pretrial restraint of their
property. Other types of property, such as money, are not as susceptible to the
identification of possible true owners. Again, due process only requires that
the government take reasonable steps to afford notice to reasonably identifi-
able property owners. 252
247. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
248. Id at 314.
249. See Armstrong v. Manzo, U.S. 545, 552 (1965). Notice must be timely to provide oppor-
tunity to be heard "at meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Id See also Mullane, 339
U.S. at 313-14.
250. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317-20.
251. See Jaekal v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (discovery of car owner's
name through title of automobile confiscated); Smith, supra note 41, at 693.
252. The notice provided to third parties should include adequate notice of the inclusion of
their assets in the properties sought to be forfeited by the governments and, assuming no exparte
order has already been entered, notice of any attempt by the government to have pretrial restraints
placed on the property. The notice should state the time and place where the two separate types of
1983]
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(2) Formality of the Proceedings
Determining the degree of formality necessary to address defendant and
third-party claims requires assessing the need for an adversarial setting, the
requisite burdens of production and persuasion, the applicability of eviden-
tiary rules, and the right to counsel. The first two issues have been addressed
and are now simply refocused. Conflicting claims between the defendant,
third party and the government to property potentially forfeitable are compet-
ing, adversary interests that constitutionally require an adversary hearing for
determination.253 As the moving party, the government bears the burden of
production and also carries the burden of persuasion, constitutionally estab-
lished by the standard of clear and convincing evidence. As for evidentiary
rules, two courts have held applicable the Federal Rules of Evidence at pre-
trial hearings adjudicating restraining orders for in personam forfeiture
cases. 254 Although courts decided the issue on statutory grounds, observing
that federal evidentiary rules apply to all criminal proceedings, arguably a
more fundamental due process rationale would reach the same result. Re-
gardless of the basis, it seems clear that the rules of evidence should aid the
truth-seeking function of the adversary hearing: "to place information before
the factfinder. ' '25 5 This is especially true when discretion is the watchword of
a pretrial restraining order determination.
The rights to appear and be represented by retained counsel should be
accorded property owners. Because of obvious conflict of interest problems,
counsel for the defendant cannot adequately represent third party property
owners when they may have potentially adverse claims. Although a third
party's right to an attorney has a constitutional foundation, it is unlikely that
the Constitution requires appointment of counsel at the government's
property infringements will take place, and clearly state the consequences of any failure of third
parties to appear. See FED. R. CiuM. P. 12(c) (court sets date for pretrial motions). The failure of
a third party to appear at the hearing after adequate notice has been issued should operate to
waive its right to object to either pretrial restraints or to any subsequent forfeiture hearing. See
FED. R. CriM. P. 12(f) (failure to raise defense or objections which must be made pretrial consti-
tutes waiver unless court grants relief for good cause shown); United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp.
274, 277 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon II) (failure of defendant's brother to appear to defend assets
possibly owned by him constitutes waiver of right to challenge government request for pretrial
restraint).
253. Cf. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 245 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon I). Although
the Veon I court ostensibly based its ruling on statutory grounds, attention to the wording of the
opinion indicates a constitutional ruling. The Veon I court, in an attempt to avoid a constitutional
ruling, noted the troublesome due process issues implicated by not granting an adversarial hearing
to the defendant before the imposition of pretrial restraints. The Veon I court attempted to avoid
the constitutional question "by finding that implicit in the statutory scheme is a requirement for a
timely adversary hearing." Id at 245. While the court's attempt to avoid a constitutional ruling is
praiseworthy, a court cannot simply read provisions into a statute from whole cloth in order to
sidestep constitutional issues. The constitutional basis of the Veon I court's holding is further
evidenced by the court's statement in footnote seven that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), would require an identical conclusion were the question framed as a constitutional issue.
Veon I, 538 F. Supp. at 245 n.7.
254. See United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, at 614 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 248-49 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Veon I).






Upon conviction, the defendant "shall forfeit to the United States (1) any
interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any
interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any
kind affording a source of influence over" 257 the racketeering enterprise
proven at trial. Having passed on the defendant's guilt, the same trier of fact
must determine the scope of the forfeiture, if any. To date, however, this pro-
cedure has been given only perfunctory attention. In fact, only two aspects of
the trier of fact's deliberations are well settled. First, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure establish that "a special verdict shall be returned as to the
extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any."258 Second, the
government shoulders the burden of production and persuasion on the scope
of forfeiture.259 Beyond these two propositions, commentators and courts
have not discussed the procedural apparatus necessary to enter a valid RICO
forfeiture judgment. Because the government's title to the property "vests" at
this juncture, compliance with the demands of procedural due process is most
compelling. This section addresses the dictates of due process at the post-
conviction stage of a RICO proceeding.
A. Content of the Hearing: Asset Defenses
The substantive questions surrounding the scope of a RICO forfeiture
have not been definitively answered in the early case law generated under the
1970 statute. Hence, largely unresolved issues confront the trier of fact in de-
termining the scope of a forfeiture. Without attempting to resolve these sub-
stantive questions, this Article notes the significant issues presently affecting
the decision of a properly instructed trier of fact. Two mutually reinforcing
principles, however, must be brought to bear on the inquiries at hand. The
first is the cardinal principle that the law abhors forfeiture.260 The second is
the rule of lenity, "of particular application"261 in construing ambiguities in
the terms of the forfeiture statute. "Such a penal foray bespeaks a need for
256. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981) (only when deriva-
tion of "physical liberty" is at stake need a court balance the Eldridge factors to determine if
counsel must be appointed for indigents).
257. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
258. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e).
259. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e) advisory committee notes (1972 amendment). "The assump-
tion of the draft is that the amount of the interest or property subject to criminal forfeiture is an
element of the offense to be alleged and proved." Id
260. See United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 286 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States
v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 962) (5th Cir. 1982) (Politz, J., dissenting); Henderson v. Carbondale
Coal & Coke Co., 140 U.S. 25 (1891); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979).
261. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864
(1979).
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circumspection." 262 Although the rule of lenity governs only where the terms
of a criminal statute are ambiguous, 263 the language and divergent case law
interpreting the scope of section 1963 leads to the conclusion that lenity must
apply.2
64
The substantive limits of a RICO forfeiture must be extrapolated from the
ambiguous wording of the racketeering statute. The operative term is "inter-
est." Broadly speaking, there are two distinct types of "interests" subject to
forfeiture. Secti6n 1963(a)(1) declares that any "interest . .. acquired or
maintained" by the defendant "in violation of section 1962" shall be forfeited.
Section 1963(2) declares forfeitable "any interest in, security of, claim against,
or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence
over" the racketeering "enterprise." Courts generally have avoided defining
what constitutes a forfeitable "interest" under these provisions. This is not
surprising, given the task of not only relating the two separate forfeitable inter-
ests to one another but also construing them in the context of the four separate
racketeering offenses.2 65 Rather than retrace arcane judicial efforts to recon-
cile these statutory provisions, a more practical exercise is merely to list the
outstanding litigable issues.
(1) Profits
Perhaps the most litigated question is whether "profits" of racketeering
activity are forfeitable under section 1963, though the Supreme Court has re-
cently ended all speculation by holding that profits are subject to RICO forfei-
ture.266 Initially, most courts said no, reasoning that because profits are
262. Id
263. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980) (lenity applicable to criminal sanc-
tions); United States v. Emmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S.
587, 596 (1961); United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 956 n.16 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (finding
"no ambiguity" in § 1963(a)(1), language "plain"), cert. granted sub nom. Russello v. United
States, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1973).
264. United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d
975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979). The holding of the Martino court that
the substantive forfeiture provisions of RICO are without ambiguity is patently wrong. See
United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983) (Martino wrong; term "interest" is
ambiguous). Despite the obvious ambiguities inherent in defining a forfeitable "interest" under
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976), the Martino court failed to explain how a predecessor panel of the
same circuit, see United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864
(1979), could have concluded that RICO's forfeiture provisions are ambiguous.
265. See, e.g., United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Romano, 523 F. Supp. 1209, 1212-15 (S.D. Fla. 1981). For example, even assum-
ing that the respective contours of the two separate forfeiture provisions are established, applying
these two distinct definitions of "interests" to the discrete types of racketeering activities--invest-
ing under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976), maintaining the enterprise under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)
(1976), conducting the enterprise under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976), and conspiring to do any of
the above under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976)--contemplate four different types ofactus reus. Re-
lating the two separate types of "interests" forfeitable under § 1963(a) to the gravamen of each
separate racketeering offense in order to determine the scope of a forfeiture is no easy task. See
United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp.
134 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (relating § 1963(a)(1) to § 1962(c)), aft'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 57 (1982).
266. See Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983). For pre-Russello opinions, see
United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952
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specifically forfeitable under the in personam provisions of the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise statute267 enacted only a week after RICO (which fails to
mention profits), Congress did not intend to include profits in the racketeering
statute.268 Buttressing this rationale, courts determined that the forfeitability
of a defendant's property must be circumscribed by the "enterprise" element
of the racketeering offense.269 Courts reached this latter conclusion by consid-
ering RICO's legislative history as well as looking to the purgative purposes of
the statute.270 Subsequently, however, some courts have retreated from the
"enterprise" limitation on the scope of a RICO forfeiture.27' In a sharply di-
vided en banc decision effectively overruling two previous panel decisions, the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Martino,272 recently held that racketeering
profits are forfeitable because there is no "enterprise" restriction on the scope
of forfeiture under section 1963(a)(1). 273 The dissenters in the Fifth Circuit en
banc decision argued that the majority's holding does not simplify the distinc-
tion between 1963(a)(1) and (2) but instead complicates delineation of a de-
fendant's forfeitable interest.274 The Supreme Court has affirmed the en banc
Martino decision, thereby resolving the question.275 Nevertheless, certain
practical consequences result from the Supreme Court's holding.
The government's evidence during the criminal trial serves to adjudicate
both the scope of the enterprise and the extent of the defendant's criminal
participation in furtherance of that enterprise. After the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Russello, the scope of the enterprise becomes relevant under section
1963(a)(2).276 Because section 1963(a)(2) "is restricted to an interest in an en-
terprise" 277 the government need only prove the defendant's proportional
ownership or control rights in the enterprise. In contrast, the extent of the
defendant's criminal racketeering conduct becomes relevant under section
1963(a)(1). Because section 1963(a)(1), according to the Supreme Court, ap-
plies in literal terms only to property "illegally" 278 acquired or maintained, the
government shoulders a higher evidentiary obligation.
Without the aid of the "enterprise" guidepost, the extent of forfeiture
(5th Cir. 1982) (reversing a panel that held profits not within RICO forfeiture provisions), cert
granted sub nom Russello v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983); United States v. Godoy, 678
F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982) (limiting Marubeni holding to liquid, uninvested assets); United States v.
Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 351 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763
(9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aft'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982).
267. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1976).
268. See United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 766 n.7 (9th Cir. 1980).
269. Id at 769.
270. See id
271. United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. grantedsub nom.
Russello v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983).
272. Id
273. Id at 955-56.
274. Id at 965 (Politz, J., dissenting).
275. See Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983).
276. Id at 301.
277. Id at 300.
278. Id
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under section 1963(a)(1) must be determined by linking the property to racke-
teering conduct. Thus, the government must present evidence of an "interest
...acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962."279 Rather than
merely pointing to the defendant's property interest in the alleged enterprise,
the government has an affirmative duty under 1963(a)(1) to prove both de-
fendant's ownership and a culpable connection between the defendant's crimi-
nal conduct and the property. In accordance with section 1963(a)(1)'s own
terms and the interpretation the Supreme Court has given them, the govern-
ment assumes a tracing obligation to link the forfeitable property to a criminal
racketeering violation. Several circuits already may have adopted this ap-
proach by requiring that the government establish a nexus between specific
forfeitable assets and some culpable conduct by the defendant.
280
Moreover, even under section 1963(a)(2), questions remain regarding the
precise scope of the "enterprise" limitation. Assuming that forfeiture of a de-
fendant's interest in an enterprise without any proof of a culpable nexus be-
tween the property and the defendant can survive constitutional challenge,
28'




Given the length of time involved in prosecuting complex RICO cases,
the property eventually forfeited most likely will have undergone some
changes since the return of the indictment regardless of whether a pretrial re-
straining order has been entered in the interim. One constitutional issue is
whether the government is entitled to any post-indictment changes in the form
or value of the property. Because the indictment specifically lists and thereby
limits the assets subject to forfeiture, post-indictment changes arguably are not
forfeitable. Moreover, whether the government is entitled to go beyond the
279. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1976).
280. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that court should instruct
jury that government must prove nexus between property and criminal conduct beyond a reason-
able doubt); United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1195 (10th Cir. 1982) (remanding forfeiture for
determination of "untainted interests" and "interests of innocent third parties").
281. By its own terms, the "enterprise" limitation forfeits the defendant's interest in the enter-
prise and no more. Id at 963-65. While this may be an accurate statutory construction of
§ 1963(a)(1), the constitutional validity of this position is subject to doubt. Put simply, this posi-
tion holds the mere ownership by the defendant of "enterprise" property will trigger forfeiture of
that property. Whether the Constitution permits the forfeiture of property without even a showing
of a criminal connection between the property and the owner, other than ligitimate ownership, is a
valid issue. Cf Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974) (dicta)
(forfeiture of property improper without some criminal nexus between property and in rem claim-
ant); United States v. One Tintoretto Painting, 691 F.2d 603, 607 (1982) (Calero-Toledo forfeiture
exception must be given effect).
282. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (1976) speaks of "interest" affording a source of influence. Defin-
ing what constitutes a right that affords such influence has never been addressed by courts. The
91st Congress, however, has made what appears to be a legislative finding of fact on the issue. 18
U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976) has a one-percent exception for investing money in stocks. The legislative
history indicates that Congress believed that one-percent ownership of stock could not afford a
source of influence over an "enterprise." See infra note 292. Surely other examples could be
found of property rights that do not provide significant control over "enterprises."
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terms contained in the indictment to reach assets under section 1963 is an issue
posing greater difficulties than simply lack of notice283 to the defendant.
Rather, bringing post-indictment property developments within the forfeiture
constructively amends the indictment. The Constitution, of course, permits
neither the prosecutor nor the court to expand the indictment through con-
structive amendments.
2 84
Even if post-indictment property developments are not constitutionally
immune from forfeiture, a statutory question remains whether the RICO stat-
ute purports to make them subject to forfeiture. Courts recently have alluded
to, but not squarely addressed, this inquiry.285 This issue is reducible to
whether the government enjoys a constructive trust or a equitable lien on the
property listed in the indictment.
286
(3) Pre-Indictment Property Transfers
If property no longer belongs to the defendant on the day of the indict-
ment, it is not an "interest" of the defendant subject to forfeiture.287 The pur-
gative purpose of the forfeiture statute is achieved if the defendant
disassociates himself from the enterprise assets before the prosecution ever be-
gins.28 8 If the government proves a sham transaction, however, the defendant
arguably still retains a sufficient "interest" to support a finding of forfeiture. 289
283. See United States v. Hall, 521 F.2d 406, 407-08 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); United
States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1977); FED. R_ C~iM. P. 7(c)(2).
284. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960); United States v. Salinas, 601 F.2d 1279 (5th
Cir. 1979); Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see Exparte Bain, 121 U.S. 1
(1887); United States v. Figueroa, 666 F.2d 1375 (1lth Cir. 1982). In the related context of a
prosecution under 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976), the Second Circuit has erroneously reached the conclu-
sion, that there can be no constructive amendment of the indictment with respect to the scope of in
personam forfeitures because the grand jury need not pass the quantity of assets subject to forfei-
ture. United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1025 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit
based its dicta on the ground that the scope of the forfeiture is not an essential element of the
offense. Id The Grammatikos court failed to address or distinguish the unequivocal language of
the Advisory Committee, which stated: "the amount of the interest of property subject to criminal
forfeiture is an element of the offense to be alleged and approved." FED. R. CRiM. P. 3 1(e) advi-
sory committee note (1972 amendment).
285. United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 961 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. granted sub
nom Russello v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983).
286. Id In simple terms, a constructive trust would allow the government to reap whatever
appreciation in value had accrued to the forfeited assets since the date of indictment. An equita-
ble lien, on the other hand, would limit the government to the value of the assets as of the date of
indictment.
287. This obvious proposition is nothing more than a function of the defendant's status as
owner. If the defendant does not own an asset, he cannot forfeit it. Ownership is a factual matter
that the government must prove to the trier of fact. More importantly, upon forfeiture of an asset
the government can only step into the shoes of the defendant. Thus, the United States only ac-
quires the type of title owned by the defendant, nothing more. See United States v. McManigal,
708 F.2d 276, 289 (7th Cir. 1983).
288. United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 n.1l (9th Cir. 1980) ("The gov-
ernment loses sight of [Congress's purpose in enacting RICO] when it argues that a 'loophole'
would be created if racketeers were allowed to divest themselves of interests in an enterprise and
thereby avoid forfeiture. Divestiture is not exploitation of a 'loophole'. It is the action Congress
intended to induce.").
289. See United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189 (D. Md. 1981), afd and remanded, 705
F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1983). InMandel the jury had made a finding that the defendant in fact owned
certain assets despite the record ownership of a third party, Irwin Schwartz. The jury found that
19831
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If property remains in the defendant's possession from the time of the
offense until the day of the indictment, one question is whether, upon convic-
tion and judgment of forfeiture, the government's title "relates back" to the
time of the offense. In United States v. McManigai290 the government at-
tempted to apply the so-called "relation back" doctrine to the defendant's in-
terest at the time of the offense, in certain accounts receivable that had since
been paid. In a thoughtful opinion, the Seventh Circuit rejected this argu-
ment. The court correctly recognized that the relation back doctrine derives
from in rem proceedings based upon the "guilt" of property "independent of
the innocence or guilt of the owner," whereas a RICO forfeiture can occur
only upon proof of the defendant's guilt.
291
(4) Non-Exercisable Interests
One of the two express exceptions292 to RICO's forfeiture provisions cov-
ers property rights "or other interest[s] . . not exercisable or transferable for
value by the United States .... 293 These interests "shall expire and shall not
revert to the convicted person. ' 294 Unfortunately, the statute does not define
this type of property, and no court has attempted to give content to this ex-
plicit exception. 295 Possible candidates for the category of non-exercisable
the defendant owned the assets "through Irving Schwartz, as nominee." Id at 190. See also
United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 280 n.13 (E.D. 1982) (Veon II) (noting possible applica-
bility of doctrine of fraudulent conveyances to question of sham transfers); United States v.
McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 279 n.7 (7th Cir. 1983) (government should be allowed to show sham
transfers).
290. 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983).
291. Id at 287-88. Unfortunately, the McManigal court did not apply the distinction between
in rem and in personam forfeitures completely because the McManigal court stated that the gov-
ernment's title may attach at either conviction or the entrance of a pretrial restraining order. Ob-
viously, a judge's decision to enter a pretrial restraining order should not affect the time that the
government's title attaches for in personam forfeitures. A judge's decision to enter a pretrial re-
straining order is emphatically not a judgment of guilt and may, in fact, be motivated by numer-
ous considerations unrelated to the defendant's guilt. Most importantly, as the McManigal court
implicitly acknowledge through its citation of United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274 (E.D. Cal.
1982) (Veon II), until a guilty verdict is rendered in an in personam forfeiture the government has
no title or equitable interest in the defendant's property. See McManigal, 708 F.2d at 289.
292. The other explicit exception to the RICO forfeiture provisions relates to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a)(2) (1976). That section requires forfeiture of defendant's interests "affording a source of
influence" over the enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976). Section 1962(a), how-
ever, makes an explicit exception for one percent of outstanding securities in the "enterprise".
The legislative history indicates quite clearly that this one percent exception was intended to allow
even racketeers the opportunity to make investments as long as the investment did not provide a
source of control over the legitimate enterprise. See House Hearings, supra note 103, at 170 (De-
partment of Justice comments) ("The title seeks to prohibit investments which permit the racket-
eer to exercise some degree of control over the business in which he invests."); Measures Relating
to Organized Crime: Hearings Before the SubcomrL on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 406 (1969) (Department of Justice offers 1%
amendment to § 1962(a) because it would only afford investment opportunity to racketeers; rack-
eteer could exercise no control with such a small interest in enterprise).
293. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976).
294. Id
295. There are only two reported constructions of this provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976).
See United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 992 n.18 (5th Cir. 1977) cert. denied 444 U.S. 864
(1979); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983). The Rubin court held that a de-
fendant union official could forfeit his elected union office. In so doing, the court noted that this
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property interests include the voting and management rights attached to for-
feited property. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has held that a convicted
union official could forfeit his elected union office under RICO.296 Because
the government cannot transfer or sell an elected union office, this property
interest should simply expire.297 There is, however, some obscure legislative
history indicating that the government may exercise the interim management
and voting rights incident to the ownership of forfeited property.
298
A possible reconciliation of these two positions could occur by reference
to the alienability restrictions under state law of the property right in ques-
tion.299 For example, voting rights in stock are freely transferable to other
parties unless explicitly restricted. Conversely, limited partnership voting
rights generally are non-assignable absent consent of the partnership. In the
first case, stock voting rights are "exercisable" property interests. In the sec-
ond case, partnership voting rights are "nonexercisable," subject only to expi-
ration of the defendant's interest. In short, to determine whether certain
property interests are "not exercisable or transferable" by the federal govern-
ment, courts should look to the state law restrictions already placed upon the
property. Regardless of whether courts adopt this particular interpretation,
however, this explicit exception to a RICO forfeiture must be given substan-
tive meaning.
B. Purfpose of Post-Trial Hearing
The foregoing legal and factual issues currently are considered by the jury
at the same time that it determines the defendant's guilt. Failure to address
these questions at a separate hearing after a finding of guilt presents several
result would be obtained even though the United States could not assume the elected office. Cit-
ing § 1963(c) the Rubin court stated that the defendant's elected position would simply terminate.
Rubin, 559 F.2d at 992. The Cauble court subsequently attempted to elaborate on the meaning of
this provision by way of dicta. Initially the Cauble court had apparently held that the defendant's
general partnership position in the legitimate "enterprise" was transferable to the United States.
Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1350. After determining that the defendant's partnership position was "exer-
cisable or transferable," by the United States, there was no reason for the Cauble court to consider
the meaning of this provision of § 1963(c). Nevertheless, the Cauble court's construction of the
provision is not completely satisfying. Briefly, the Cauble court distinguished the defendant's situ-
ation in Rubin from that in Cauble by stating that Cauble's general partnership office did not
constitute a "position" whereas Rubin's elected union office did. Id It is respectfully submitted
that this is a distinction without a difference. Cauble's office as a general partner, like the offices
of most corporate directors, is a "position" requiring the continuous consent of the other partners.
The tenure of the defendant as a corporate official may have little if anything to do with the
defendant's property interests in the underlying "enterprise."
296. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979).
297. Id at 992 n.18.
298. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1969) ("The United States is required to dis-
pose of property as promptly as it is practical, with due regard for the rights of innocent persons,
and shall have voting or management rights in the interim as provided by the court.").
299. Cf. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977) (forfeiture of elected office
under RICO may be controlled by separate statutory restraints on voting rights), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 864 (1979). See also United States v. Rogers, 103 S. Ct. 2132 (1983) (majority holding that
state homestead exemption may fall to federal tax lien based on equitable considerations; four
dissenters argue that government steps into shoes of tax debtor). For a discussion of federal law
incorporation of state law, see H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM 489-94 (2d ed. 1873).
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difficulties.30 Inherent in the criminal defense of a racketeering charge is a
denial of the government's right to forfeiture. The defendant cannot very eas-
ily proffer particular asset defenses for specific property during trial because
his criminal defense is necessarily a complete property defense. Indeed, forc-
ing a defendant to make a particular asset defense before the trier of fact
reaches a guilty verdict places the defendant in the unenviable position of con-
ceding the government's charges of criminal involvement with respect to assets
for which he can muster no legal or factual defense.30 1 A separate hearing is
not only constitutionally required but is practically indispensible to fair effec-
tuation of a RICO forfeiture.30
2
For third parties whose property rights are affected by a possible forfei-
ture judgment, the post-trial hearing is not only the first opportunity to defend
their assets against the backdrop of the government's evidence at trial but also
the last opportunity to assert asset defenses before the government acquires
superior title to the property.
The purpose of the post-trial hearing is thus fairly simple. In determining
the defendant's guilt, the trier of fact necessarily has reached some conclusions
regarding the breadth of the "enterprise ' 303 and the extent of the defendant's
participation in the enterprise. 3 4 Against the evidence proffered at trial, both
defendant and third parties address their arguments to the trier of fact on the
scope of the forfeiture. While the reasons for the hearing are straightforward,
the substantive issues are complex. If the trial court concludes that profits are
forfeitable, the government must proffer evidence tracing these profits from
300. In one case, failure to hold a hearing to determine conclusively the rights of all parties to
property the government claimed as forfeitable resulted in a third party coming into court years
after trial to allege a stake in property within the forfeiture verdict. United States v. Mandel, 505
F. Supp. 189 (D. Md. 1981), af'dmem. and remanded, 705 F.2d 445, 446 (4th Cir. 1983).
301. Indeed, forcing the defendant to assert specific property defenses may run afoul of the
fifth amendment's self-incrimination privilege.
302. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that bifurcated proceedings are necessary to effectuate a
RICO forfeiture. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983). The Cauble court stated:
To ease the juror's task in determining guilt or innocence, the forfeiture issue should be
withheld from them until after they have returned a general verdict. At that time the
trial judge can instruct the jurors fully about forfeiture and submit the special verdict to
them. Such a bifurcated trial-using, of course, only one jury-is only convenient for
the judge and fairer to the defendant.
Id at 1348. The Cauble court did not pause to explain from whence it fashioned this "fairer"
procedure. Presumably, reasons of practicality suggested bifurcation to the Cauble court.
Whether the Cauble court's admonition stemmed from constitutional or supervisory power con-
siderations cannot be determined from the opinion itself. It should be evident, however, that the
Court's authority to order bifucation of all future Fifth Circuit forfeiture trials for fairness reasons
did not stem from the Cauble panel's authority as an arbitration board.
303. See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394-95 (2d Cir. 1979) (if defendant owns vari-
ous business associations, the jury must find that each specific entity is involved in racketeering
activity before including it in an "enterprise" to support a forfeiture).
304. See House Hearings, supra note 103, at 107 (statement of Senator McClellan) (RICO
"would punish the criminal appropriately by forfeiting to the government his ill-acquired interests
in a legitimate business") (emphasis added); Id at 171 (Justice Department comments on S.30)
(RICO provides "for the forfeiture of any interest which has been attained in violation of the
criminal provisions of the statute"); 116 CONG. REC. 592 (1970) (remarks of Senator McClellan)
(RICO "would forfeit the ill-gotten gains of criminals where they enter or operate an organization
through a pattern racketeering activity").
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the racketeering activity or, at least, the enterprise. Post-indictment changes in
and pre-indictment transfer of the property may have to be removed from the
scope of the forfeiture. Interests "not exercisable or transferable" may be ex-
empted from forfeiture. The complexity of these issues serves to introduce the
next question: What should be the nature of the hearing at which these argu-
ments may be raised.
C Procedural Due Process-Application to Post-Conviction Proceedings
(1) Notice
As earlier discussed, notice is a flexible concept. Constitutionally, notice
must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise inter-
ested parties of the pendency of the action. ' 30 5 Hence, if notice is sufficiently
broad at the pretrial stage, a property owner who has not appeared earlier may
be deemed to have waived receipt of further notice and the opportunity to be
heard at the post-conviction proceedings. 3°6 Similarly, a property owner who
has had his property interest adjudicated adversely before trial may not have
any right to notice of subsequent proceedings against the property.
(2) The Neutrality of the Hearing
The racketeering statute specifically affords third parties a forum of en-
treaty for return of property by way of an unreviewable plea to the Attorney
General, the successful adverse litigant in the criminal proceedings. The ques-
tion is whether a hearing only before a government official is constitutionally
sufficient.
A significant line of procedural due process precedent strongly suggests
that the neutrality of the proceedings at which infringements on protected in-
terests are reviewed is a key inquiry used to assess the adequacy of the process
afforded.307 Beyond the obvious issue of a direct 30 8 or indirect30 9 interest of
305. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1949).
306. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 190 (D. Md. 1981) (court order
requiring notice to be sent to all affected parties prior to forfeiture judgment), aft'd mem. and
remanded, 705 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1983). The harshness of a rule that closes the doors to the court
after adequate notice has been given is mitigated by allowing affected parties to show good cause
why they failed to appear. See FED. R. CriM. P. 12(f). Nevertheless, once a properly instructed
jury has entered an appropriate forfeiture verdict, all parties should be prohibited from challeng-
mg any aspect of that verdict directly related to the jury's factual findings of guilt.
307. See Johnson v. American Credit Co. of Ga., 581 F.2d 525, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1978) (sum-
marizing Supreme Court due process cases as requiring judicial participation in property depriva-
tions). Cf. United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D. Md. 1981) ("Our system would not
tolerate a statutory scheme which could be effectuated in such a way as to deny constitutional
rights, yet evade any type ofjudicial review."), a 'd mer and remanded, 705 F.2d 446 (4th Cir.
1983).
308. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) ("It is sufficiently clear from our
cases that those with substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate
these disputes."); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) ("It certainly violates the fourteenth
amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his
liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substan-
tial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.").
309. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60-61 (1972) (mayor's executive
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the trier of fact in the outcome of a hearing, the Supreme Court recently has
indicated that due process concerns may require that a judicial officer pass on
summary property infringements even between private parties.3 10 In a RICO
prosecution in which the government, rather than a private party, seeks prop-
erty deprivation, the presumption of judicial review is strong.311 Thus, a plea
to the Attorney General does not suffice to protect third party interests.
Rather, due process demands a neutral, disinterested mechanism of review-a
hearing before judge and jury-prior to forfeiture of third party property
rights.
(3) The Formality of the Proceedings
At the post-conviction stage, the government's interest in the property
subject to forfeiture has traveled a considerable distance from the speculative
allegations of the indictment. Nevertheless, the racketeering statute envisions
that the burden of production and persuasion remain with the government in a
manner identical to the factual determination of guilt. Rule 31 (e) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the return of a special verdict
detailing the scope of the forfeiture. This verdict is currently returned with the
guilty verdict. The Advisory Committee Notes to the Rule explain that "the
amount of the interest or property subject to forfeiture is an element of the
offense to be proved. ' 312 Thus, as part of the criminal offense itself, forfeiture
requires an adversary proceeding placing the burden of proof upon the gov-
ernment to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the particular property that
may be forfeited.
The question whether the Federal Rules of Evidence apply at the post-
conviction proceeding has not been litigated, although the answer seems obvi-
ous. Because the post-trial hearing concerning the extent of forfeiture is an
integral part of the RICO prosecution, the federal rules apply to the same
degree as applied to the evidence of substantive guilt brought before the jury.
Other procedural trappings also required include the rights to appear and to
retain counsel. 31
3
responsibilities for village finances subjects him to a "possible temptation" to levy fees and costs,
which deprives a defendant of the neutrality required by due process even though the mayor has
no direct interest in the funds); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 134-36 (1955) (a contempt proceed-
ing violates the due process requirement of an impartial tribunal when the judge who presided
over the proceeding out of which the contempt charge arose also presides over the contempt
proceeding.).
310. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975) (Georgia at-
tachment statute is unconstitutional because it allows issuance of a writ of garnishment "by a
court clerk without notice or opportunity for an early hearing and without participation by a
judicial officer."); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 617 (1974) (Louisiana sequestration
statute passes constitutional muster partly because the creditor is required to make a clear showing
of necessity to, and receive authorization from, a judge); Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d
125, 130-31 (8th Cir. 1975) (a North Dakota statute does not pass muster because it fails to provide
"meaningful judicial supervision of the prejudgement attachment process").
311. See generally Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975) (presumption of review when
Social Security benefits are removed).
312. FED. R. CIuM. P. 31(e) advisory committee notes (1972 amendment).




A current controversy is whether the trial court has the authority to mod-
ify a jury determination of forfeiture. 314 The unprecedented severity of the
forfeiture sanction not only to the defendant but possibly to "innocent per-
sons" and the enormous economic complexities in determining the scope of
forfeiture demand special circumspection before permitting unbridled jury
discretion on the issue of forfeiture. A RICO forfeiture secures only the de-
fendant's interest in the enterprise, not any other property "untainted" by
criminal activity.315 An incorrect calculation of forfeiture could result in loss
of "a lifetime's legitimate earnings or an inherited estate invested in a legiti-
mate business enterprise. . . to the prejudice of [spouse] and child as well as
the accused. '316 The question is whether Congress intended to place in the
hands of a jury sole responsibility for such a result.
There are three issues to be considered. The first is a question of statutory
interpretation. RICO provides that, "Upon conviction of a person under this
section, the court shall authorize the Attorney General to seize all property or
other interest declared forfeited under the section upon such terms and condi-
tions as the court shall deem proper .' 3 17 The question is whether this language
mandates forfeiture through use of the term "shall," or permits discretion
through use of the phrase "as the court shall deem proper." The Fifth Circuit,
focusing on the phrase "the court shall authorize," dismissed the "terms and
conditions" clause as merely governing administrative details, and held that a
trial court is without authority to modify a jury determination. 318 The Second
Circuit interpreted the same language to permit the district court "a certain
amount of discretion in avoiding draconian. . . applications of the forfeiture
provision. '31 9  Without elaboration, the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
Zang320 held that the "terms and conditions" language of section 1963(3) be-
stowed "authority" on district courts to mitigate forfeiture verdicts to protect
third party property interests.
321
Moreover, a forfeiture fits into the traditional concept of a sentence. As
the Fifth Circuit recognized, "A sentence in a criminal case is the action of the
Court fixing and declaring the legal consequences of predetermined guilt of a
criminal offense."322 After adjudication of guilt by the jury, the court, not the
jury, enters the forfeiture judgment. In so doing, a court can exercise only that
314. United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 190 (D. Md. 1981), af'dmenL and remanded,
705 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1983).
315. See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1979).
316. United States v. L'Hoste, 615 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir.) (Tate, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for rehearing en bane), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
317. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
318. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 811-13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833
(1980).
319. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979).
320. 703 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1982).
321. Id at 1195.
322. United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298, 310 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Barnes v. United
States, 223 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1955)).
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amount of statutory or constitutional authority entrusted to it. Consequently,
if the court determines that the scope of the forfeiture is unlawful, there can be
little doubt that it has the authority to confine the judgment of forfeiture to its
statutory or constitutional limits. Obviously, if the jury determines that the
defendant must forfeit the Eiffel Tower to the government, the court would
recognize its lack of authority to tender this to the government. Therefore, the
question whether a judge has the discretion to modify the forfeiture verdict is
misplaced. Afortiori, if the court has the power to correct an illegal sentence
at any time (because it had no power to enter it),323 it can act to correct a jury's
determination before judgment is entered.
The second argument is related to the nature of a RICO forfeiture. The
Fifth Circuit stated that it derived "insight" into the scope of a trial court's
discretion to amend a finding of forfeiture from the customs laws, 324 incorpo-
rated by reference in the racketeering statute. These laws, as earlier discussed,
afford courts "very little control over actions taken by those charged with the
power to grant remission and mitigation. '325 In like fashion, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the trial court has no control over the actions taken by a jury in
determining a forfeiture.
The customs laws, however, properly apply to in rem forfeitures, which
are largely remedial in effect and quite different from in personam forfeitures
applied primarily to punish. While Congress noted the prophylactic aspects of
a RICO forfeiture in severing the convicted defendant's connection to legiti-
mate business, RICO's legislative history indicates the supremacy of the puni-
tive rationale.326 Hence, the Fifth Circuit's reliance on the in rem customs
laws to preclude the trial court from exercising discretion to remit or mitigate
the forfeiture sanction erroneously disregards the in personam nature of a
RICO forfeiture.
A final argument considers mandatory forfeiture pursuant to a jury deter-
uination to be contrary to the traditionally broad discretion accorded judges
to impose punishment at sentencing. 327 Three circuits have recognized that
forfeiture, as a form of punishment, is a sentence.3 28 Moreover, Congress stat-
utorily provided broad sentencing authority to trial courts in 18 U.S.C. section
3651, which permits suspension of imprisonment when the judge is "satisfied
that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public will be served
323. Id at 308.
324. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 811-12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833
(1980); cf. United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 192 n.2 (D. Md. 1981) (questioning scope of
judicial review after exhaustion of administrative appeal), affdmem, and remanded, 705 F.2d 446
(4th Cir. 1983).
325. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 786, 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
326. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
327. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980) (judge may conduct wide inquiry
without limit to type or source of information); 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976).
328. See United States v. Hess, 691 F.2d 188, 191 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Godoy, 678
F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979); Cf., United
States v. Sheeran, 699 F.2d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 1983) (when RICO predicates vacated, action re-
manded to trial court "for resentencing and reconsideration of the judgment of forfeiture");
United States v. Murillo, 709 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1983) (under CCE statute).
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thereby." Section 3651 is silent about forfeitures, as well as about fines, yet
courts have interpreted it to permit suspension of financial penalties.329 For-
feiture is no different.
Nonetheless, RICO has been held to embody a legislative mandate to re-
move judicial discretion by imposing a specific penalty for violation of the
racketeering statute.330 On the other hand, one Fifth Circuit judge, joined by
three others, argues: "In light of the usual discretion of the sentencing judge in
the imposition of any sentence, I would not infer any Congressional intent,
unless much more clearly stated, to deprive the judge of discretion in the im-
position of the forfeiture penalty."
'33 1
The better argument affords the sentencing judge his usual discretion with
regard to forfeiture. The term "shall" in the racketeering statute is not only
sometimes construed as the equivalent of "may, '332 but is used "in pro forma
drafting style. . . in virtually all the statutory sentencing provisions. '333 Ju-
dicial deference to those charged with modification of forfeiture is not applica-
ble to an in personam proceeding. A forfeiture is a sentence, imposition of
which traditionally looks to the wisdom of trial court judges. Finally, the risk
of erroneous deprivation of property in a complicated RICO prosecution
harbors such untoward economic consequences to both the defendant and
third parties that judicial review is a constitutional, 334 if not a statutory
necessity.
After a forfeiture judgment becomes final through affirmance on appeal
or through the defendant's failure to note an appeal, 335 the government is enti-
tled to execute its judgment of forfeiture. Of course, the ease of execution may
well depend on the complexity of the property interests involved.336 A prob-
lem quickly ensues, however, when there remains some dispute as to the extent
329. United States v. L'Hoste, 615 F.2d 383, 384 (5th Cir.) (rate, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
330. See United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 813 n.15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833
(1980).
331. United States v. L'Hoste, 615 F.2d 383, 385 (5th Cir.) (Tate, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
332. See Richbourge Motor Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 528, 534 (1930) ("shall is sometimes
the equivalent of 'may' when used in a statute prospectively affecting government action").
333. United States v. L'Hoste, 615 F.2d 383, 385 (5th Cir.) (Tate, J., dissenting form denial of
petition for rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
334. See United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D. Md. 1981) ("some exercise of
judicial discretion might prove proper in order to avoid the unconstitutional application of this
statute"), affd mem. and remanded, 705 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1983).
335. In a disturbing development, two circuit courts have held that failure to file a separate
notice of appeal from the forfeiture judgment deprives the appellate court of appellate jurisdic-
tion. United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1343 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Martino,
681 F.2d 952, 953 n.10 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. grantedsub nor. Russello v. United States, 103 S. Ct.
721 (1983). Given the ambiguity surrounding the character of a forfeiture order-be it a sentence
or a judgment-requiring a separate notice of appeal should not be necessary. See Sanabria v.
United States, 437 U.S. 54, 67 n.21 (1978) ("A mistake in designating the judgment appealed from
is not always fatal, so long as the intent to appeal from a specific ruling can fairly be inferred by
probing the notice and the other party was not misled or prejudiced.").
336. Cf. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394-95 (2d Cir. 1970) (for complex cases no
error in jury charge if elements of RICO violation are included and jury is made aware of the
business-violation nexus).
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of the government's title. There may be considerable disagreement among the
affected parties relating to the scope of the forfeiture order, either on its face or
as applied. For example, if the forfeited property is now co-owned or shared
by the government and a third party, disputes may arise about the govern-
ment's duties to the third party. Tensions may arise between the government's
statutory goal of swiftly liquidating its judgment 337 and a property owner's
legal obligation to protect particular assets. In addition, a property owner may
have a valid claim that his property was erroneously included within the list of
assets in the forfeiture judgment.338 The issue then is what remedy is avail-
able either to the defendant or to third parties in the face of an improper gov-
ernment construction of its property interest.
The availability of collateral attacks on in personam forfeiture judgments
is a formidable question in itself. In general, it is safe to say that the position
of the government is that there are no collateral avenues for reviewing a RICO
forfeiture judgment other than that afforded by the administrative remedy of a
petition for remission or mitigation. 339 Nevertheless, at least two courts have
addressed collateral challenges to a RICO forfeiture, albeit without detailed
analysis of what constitutes an appropriate vehicle for asserting collateral at-
tacks on a RICO forfeiture judgment. In United States v. Hess340 the Fourth
Circuit addressed a challenge to a forfeiture judgment by two convicted RICO
defendants when the defendants appealed from the trial court's denial of a
motion for correction of an illegal sentence under rule 35(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.3 41 The only other reported case in which a fed-
337. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976) requires that the Attorney General "shall dispose of all such
[forfeiture] property as soon as commercially feasible.. ." Id Beyond this general mandate to
liquidate forfeiture judgments in a swift manner, the statute fails to clarify from whose perspective
thp "commercial feasibility" of liquidation is to be viewed.
338. See United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 190-91 (D. Md. 1981) (third party con-
tends property within forfeiture order properly belongs to third party, not defendant, and thus not
subject-to forfeiture), afdmem. and remanded, 705 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1983). The Mandel case is
also a perfect example of the need to have judicial scrutiny of the actual forfeiture judgment. The
Mandel court noted that the government had petitioned for the forfeiture of 236,250 shares of
stock and the jury returned a special verdict for 240,765 shares of stock. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. at
180 n.1. Whether the 4,000 share discrepancy was within the terms of the forfeiture judgment is a
valid question for disagreement and litigation.
339. See United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 190-91 (D. Md. 1981) (quoting govern-
ment brief espousing view that RICO permits "judge only to take some steps to preserve the
enterprise so that the Government's interest is not destroyed p'ior to forfeiture"), affldmem and
remanded, 705 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1983).
340. 691 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1982).
341. Id at 190. The underlying contention in Hess was that the trial court had entered a
forfeiture order without requiring the jury to make specific findings on the scope of forfeiture in a
special verdict. Apparently, the parties had previously stipulated "in lieu of a [s]pecial [v]erdict"
about the respective "interests" of the defendants in various stock subject to possible forfeiture.
According to the Fourth Circuit, the failure to abide by FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(e) 's requirement for
a special verdict did not render the sentence illegal within the meaning of FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a).
Hess, 691 F.2d at 190. Although the Hess court did not indicate whether the defendant's claim
went to the manner in which sentence was imposed or to the illegality of the sentence itself, the
outcome in Hess appears reasonable enough: defendants should not be allowed to sandbag trial
courts by waiving rights under rule 31(e) and then to complain that no special verdict was used.
The unfortunate aspect of Hess, however, is that it amplifies and compounds the confusion
that pervades judicial attempts to grapple with forfeiture judgments. For example, the Hess court
inexplicably relied on the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 813
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eral court confronted a post-final judgment attack on a RICO forfeiture was in
United States v. Mandel.3 42 In Mandel, a third party challenged the govern-
ment's title to stock that had been forfeited in a criminal RICO prosecution.
343
The challenge in Mandel was based on a third party claim of ownership "as
nominee" of the convicted RICO defendant.344 While the holdings of these
two decisions are not significant in and of themselves, the fact that at least two
courts have entertained challenges to forfeiture judgments other than by way
of direct appeal from a criminal conviction is significant. Nevertheless, identi-
fying appropriate avenues for asserting post-judgment petitions for judicial re-
view of RICO forfeitures is a task that no court has squarely undertaken.
Third parties, on the other hand, face greater difficulties in trying to assert
their property rights under the auspices of a final criminal judgment.
This Article will attempt to offer an abbreviated list of possible candidates
for obtaining postjudgment review. From a broad perspective, there are two
fundamentally different routes that an aggrieved party, either defendant or
third party, may choose to take in challenging a forfeiture judgment. The first
possibility would be to seek relief in the same cause of action that contains the
forfeiture judgment. Thus, an aggrieved property owner could file an appro-
priate motion in the criminal case. The only other method for challenging a
forfeiture judgment would be to pursue an independent cause of action against
the government, or individual government officials. Because these two differ-
ent methods would necessarily invoke radically different substantive and pro-
cedural considerations, they will be discussed separately below.
(1) Proceeding by Motion Within the Same Cause of Action
A convicted RICO defendant will probably have the easiest time raising a
challenge to the forfeiture judgment by motion within the same cause of ac-
tion. Under rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure a convicted
defendant can seek a reduction of his sentence or seek relief from an illegal or
illegally imposed sentence.345 It is well established that rule 35 motions are
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980), for the proposition that entrance of a forfeiture judg-
ment is mandatory upon a jury finding of a 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976) violation. Hess, 691 F.2d at
190. The Hess court failed to consider that the basis for the L'Hoste court's narrow view of the
trial court's role in entering a forfeiture judgment stemmed from the fact that the L'Hoste court
did not consider that a forfeiture judgment was a "sentence" within the sentencing authority of a
trial judge. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 813 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 833
(1980). What the Hess court failed to perceive was that by adopting the L'Hoste court's reasoning
that a forfeiture judgement is beyond a court's sentencing power, the Hess court itself did not have
the power to address a rule 35(a) motion. Stated more clearly, a forfeiture judgment either is or is
not a criminal "sentence" within the traditional meaning of that term. For some unexplained
reason, the Hess court chose to review a forfeiture judgment as both a sentence under rule 35 and
as a non-sentence under the L'Hoste decision.
342. 505 F. Supp. 189 (D. Md. 1981). Both the Hess opinion and the Mandel opinion repre-
sent the final throes of the criminal litigation begun in 1975 with the prosecution of Maryland
governor Marvin Mandel and his associates.
343. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. at 190. The third party claimed that the forfeited stock belonged to
him and not the defendant.
344. Id
345. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
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pleadings "made in the original case.'' 346 At least two circuit courts have re-
viewed in personam forfeiture challenges made by way of a motion pursuant
to rule 35(a).347 Although courts have passed on rule 35(a) motions, there
may remain some doubt whether an in personam forfeiture judgment under
RICO constitutes a "sentence" within the meaning of rule 35(a).348 If it can
be said that a RICO forfeiture is a sentence within the ambit of rule 35, several
consequences immediately follow.
Initially, precedent under rule 35 indicates that a court is always empow-
ered to pass upon a claim that a sentence is "illegal. ' 349 This authority is "not
a real power in anything like the normal sense; rather, it is more in the nature
of a duty to confess error and acknowledge that the imposition of the original
sentence exceeded the court's statutory authority and was therefore a legal
nullity."350 As a result, the sentencing or reviewing court always will have the
authority to correct legal errors in the imposition of an in personam order.
The second major consequence of using a rule 35 motion to obtain judicial
review of the legality of a forfeiture judgment stems from the fact that a rule
35 motion is considered made in the original action. Because a rule 35(a)
motion is "made in the original case," 351 a reviewing court may take into ac-
count new precedent that was unavailable at the time of sentencing. 352 With
the unsettled nature of judicial constructions of the substantive reach of
RICO's forfeiture provisions, the use of rule 35 may allow both the govern-
ment and defendant to benefit from subsequent favorable precedent.
The exhaustion issue is relevant regardless of whether an aggrieved prop-
erty owner seeks relief within the confines of the criminal case or by way of an
independent cause of action. The benefit of requiring that an aggrieved prop-
erty owner seek relief initially through an administrative plea for remission is
obvious-preservation ofjudicial resources. The only difficulty with imposing
an exhaustion requirement is that the availability of judicial review after ex-
haustion of administrative channels is very much in doubt. In the past, courts
have held that the judiciary has no authority to review the Attorney General's
discretionary decision to remit or mitigate in rem forfeitures under the cus-
toms laws. 353 Courts have reached this conclusion despite the familiar doc-
trine that preclusion of judicial review over constitutional claims will not be
lightly inferred for administrative proceedings. 354 Assuming, however, that
346. Heffin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.7 (1950).
347. United States v. Murillo, 709 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1983) (government motion sought rever-
sal of trial court mitigation of in personam forfeiture in CCE prosecution); United States v. Hess,
691 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1982).
348. See supra note 341.
349. FED. R. CriM. P. 35(a); see United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298, 307 (5th Cir. 1983)
(plurality).
350. United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298, 308 (5th Cir. 1983) (plurality).
351. Hefrin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.7 (1950).
352. United States v. Shillingford, 586 F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing Hqlin),
353. See United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied
sub non. National Am. Bank of New Orleans v. United States, 409 U.S. 980 (1972).




some type of judicial review of the Attorney General's mitigation decision can
be invoked, a substantial question remains as to the precise scope of judicial
review available. 355 In other words, assuming some sort of judicial review is
available, what standards should govern the reviewing court? This latter ques-
tion is made all the more difficult by the absence of discrete standards for the
exercise of the Attorney General's remission authority. Mitigation decisions
need not be based on findings of culpability but rather are entrusted to the
unfettered discretion of the Attorney General. Placed in this context, for ex-
ample, the substantial evidence standard of review would appear to be inap-
plicable to mitigation decisions because the Attorney General's decision is
decidedly not made in an adjudicative setting. In conclusion, while there are a
host of unanswered questions that should be resolved before courts impose
any type of exhaustion requirement prior to challenging RICO forfeiture judg-
ments, some avenue for judicial review should be inferred in the absence of
clear congressional intent to the contrary.
35 6
Another obvious tack that an aggrieved property owner may attempt to
pursue within the same criminal cause of action is a motion for return of prop-
erty under rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The sub-
stantive basis for such a motion, of course, would have to be under the fourth
amendment's proscription of unreasonable seizures by the government.
357 Al-
though this type of motion has traditionally been confined to the pretrial
stages of a criminal prosecution,358 in an in personam forfeiture under RICO
the government technically does not have any vested property rights in forfei-
ture assets until a forfeiture verdict is entered. Hence, until a verdict of forfei-
ture has been duly entered, an aggrieved property owner cannot assert a return
of property motion. Consequently, an aggrieved property owner should be
entitled to assert a postjudgment motion for return of his property.
355. The uncertainty over the scope of any type of judicial review of the Attorney General's
administrative decision was lucidly pointed out in the Mandel opinion. See United States v.
Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 192 n.2 (D. Md. 1981), afdmem. and remanded, 705 F.2d 446 (4th Cir.
1983). While the Mandel court required exhaustion, it did so under the assumption that subse-
quent review was available.
356. See supra notes 354-355. A forceful argument can be made that exhaustion is not re-
quired at all. In an in rem setting the Second Circuit has held that the availability of administra-
tive relief was irrelevant to the ability of an in rem claimant to seek direct judicial review over an
in rem forfeiture in an independent suit. United States v. One Tintoretto Painting, 691 F.2d 603,
609 (2d Cir. 1982) (availability of administrative remedies under customs laws is no bar to in-
dependent constitutional challenge of in rem forfeiture in district court). If exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies under the customs laws is not required prior to challenging in rem forfeitures, a
fortiorari, exhaustion of in rem administrative procedures should not be required in the in per-
sonam RICO context. See also United States v. $8,850, 103 S. Ct. 2005 (1983) (in an in rem
forfeiture "claimant" need not waive his right to a prompt judicial hearing because he seeks the
additional remedy of an administrative petition for mitigation").
357. U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
358. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) requires that motions for return of property "if.. . made... in
the district of trial ... shall be treated. . . as a motion to suppress under Rule 12." FED. R.
CRIM. P. 12 requires that suppression motions be made before trial under pain of waiver. But see
United States v. $8,850, 103 S. Ct. 2005 (1983) (noting that in rem claimant could file a rule 41(e)
motion for return of property). The Court refrained from indicating when this motion would be
ripe for judicial attention, but the chances of any court entertaining a motion seeking an order
compelling the filing of an in rem forfeiture action or return of the property are remote.
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(2) Pursuing Independent Causes of Action
Identifying all possible independent causes of action that an aggrieved
party may bring against the government is a task far beyond the competence
of this Article. Nevertheless, several of the more obvious possibilities will be
sketched below. Before outlining the more salient candidates, however, a pre-
liminary observation must be made. Although declaratory and injunctive re-
lief may be the most accessible types of relief available under current legal
doctrines, the availability of an award of damages is probably of paramount
importance to an aggrieved property owner because of the high likelihood that
the sovereign has "disposed" 359 of the contested assets at the earliest possible
opportunity. Therefore, aggrieved property owners should focus their atten-
tion on identifying those causes of action for which either (1) the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is inapplicable, or (2) a specific consent to sue statute can
be found.
Under standard constitutional tort theory, a cause of action will lie
against individual federal officials for infringements of constitutional, not stat-
utory, rights.36° Although the full play of private damage suits against federal
officials has yet to be fully articulated by the Supreme Court, it is clear that
constitutional tort actions will lie under the fourth,
361 fifth,362 and eighth 363
amendments. As previously mentioned, a fourth amendment claim may be
pressed under an unreasonable seizure theory. Alternatively, a fifth amend-
ment claim could be argued under either a taking theory 364 or under a denial
of procedural due process argument.365 Finally, an eighth amendment pro-
portionality claim may form the foundation for a constitutional tort case if the
scope of forfeiture greatly exceeds the degree of the defendant's culpability.
366
In the category of consent to sue statutes, the availability of relief may
well depend on the type of property involved. The Quiet Title Act of 1972367
359. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976) (requiring disposal of forfeited goods as soon as commercially
feasible).
360. See generally Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5 (1980). Because a Biv-
ens-type private action lies only for constitutional torts, challenges based on RICO's statutory
provisions cannot be brought on a constitutional tort theory.
361. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Marcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
362. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
363. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
364. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
365. See id A procedural due process claim can be pressed under the fifth amendment, under
premise that the property was not properly before the court that entered the forfeiture judgment.
366. See also United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 857 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Huber, eighth
amendment limits scope of RICO forfeiture); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980). The Second Circuit's decision in Walsh provides a new
low-water mark in the judiciary attempt to grapple with RICO's forfeiture provisions. Although
noting that a RICO defendant has an eighth amendment challenge to the scope of forfeiture, the
Walsh court held that the defendant waived this constitutional challenge by failing to present his
eight amendment claims to the trial court. The Walsh court failed to explain how a RICO defend-
ant is suppose to make simultaneous arguments of innocence and disproportionate punishment to
the same trier of fact. This omission was further compounded by the Walsh court's insistence that
the defendant bear the burden of "moving to ameliorate the harshness of a forfeiture verdict." It
is safe to say that Walsh stood Huber on its head.
367. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1976); see also § 1346(0, 1402(d) (1976).
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may provide one means of challenging government title over realty. Con-
versely, an action for conversion under the Federal Tort Claims Act368 proba-
bly will not be available because of its exception for claims "arising in respect
of .... the detention of any goods or merchandise by. . .any other law
enforcement officer."1369 Of course, the remedies of declarative and injunctive
relief will always be available.
370
In conclusion, the exercise and scope of post-judgment relief from errone-
ous forfeiture judgments is an area of considerable uncertainty. To date very
few litigants have tested the murky waters which envelop an in personam for-
feiture judgment. Perhaps this is partly because of the general confusion
about the juridical character of the in personam forfeiture judgment itself.
Once the courts have conclusively defined their own role in entering, delimit-
ing, and modifying forfeiture judgments, perhaps the task of fashioning meth-
ods of judicial review will become less treacherous.
CONCLUSION
Congress reintroduced in personam forfeitures into American criminal ju-
risprudence in 1970 with a salutary intent. No one can dissent from RICO's
goal of divesting racketeers from their means of corrupting the economic or-
der. Nevertheless, the vehicle chosen to achieve this worthwhile end has
proven inadequate from both a substantive and a procedural perspective. By
adopting a functional, quantitative definition of "organized crime," the sub-
stantive RICO offenses are susceptible to application in contexts far removed
from the perceptions motivating the 91st Congress. Accepting, however, the
broad reach of the substantive offense, the criminal forfeiture of an ensnared
defendant's "interest" suggests a need for a more precise definition of the
property interests which can be forfeited. Only affected parties can elaborate
adequately upon the contours of the property legally or factually subject to
inclusion within the forfeitable "interest." This Article has attempted to out-
line constitutionally sufficient procedures to meet this challenge. Several
courts have already responded to this obvious lacuna in the law. It is our hope
that more will follow.
368. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
369. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1976).
370. United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 192 (D. Md. 1982) (declaratory and injunctive
relief available for aggrieved property owner if dissatisfied with results obtained through adminis-
trative channels), af'dmem, andremanded, 705 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1983). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-
2202 (1976) (Declaratory Judgment Act); Fed R. Civ. P. 57.
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